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Chapter I 
Introduction 
The Consciousness of the self is not the closing of the door to communication ... national 
consciousness, which is not nationalism is the only thing that will give us an international 
dimension. 
- Franz Fanon, 1976 
The challenge is before us. Unless we begin to work together (in Africa) to chart a course which 
can give practical effect to our shared principles, events will overtake us and we will find 
ourselves in a region largely shaped by others to our disadvantage. 
Walter Sisulu, 1992 
South Africa's power struggle and deep-rooted apartheid dispute have been resolved through 
the politics of genuine negotiations and compromise. 
With the end of apartheid and white domination now achieved, the political debate 
and scholarly discourse is enthusiastically and increasingly focusing attention on South 
Africa's future; for example, a host of interest groups - including the government of national 
unity, leading members in the business community, civics and community organisations, 
" 
academic institutions, religious institutions, etc. - is now seeking ways of becoming active 
participants in the much celebrated Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The 
RDP represents the blue-print, or more precisely manifesto for post-apartheid reconstruction 
and upliftment in South Africa. In other words, most scholarly contributions to the debate 
on post-apartheid scenarios for South Africa have, regrettably however, not dealt in any 
substantial fashion with the perspectives of foreign policy orientations and strategies for 
South Africa beyond apartheid. Yet, this is an issue of paramount importance to South 
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Africa's future. 
With the attention and concern understandably fixed on the dynamics of the important 
domestic situation, the fundamental foreign policY.itPplications and ramifications of qomestic 
-. . 
political restructuring and manoeuvring have been largely ignored. The major documents of 
the African National Congress (ANC), ipso facto the most dominant candidate in the post-
apartheid government, gives very little guidance to the foreign policy options of a liberated, 
lInon-racial, democratic ll South Africa. The ANC's Freedom Chaner speaks of regional and 
foreign policy only in vague and general terms when it recognizes the right of all the people 
of Africa to lIindependence and self-government ll , and states that such independence provides 
the lIbasis of close cooperation between the peoples of Africa ll • 1 The ANC's Constitutional 
Guidelines of 1988 also falls short of framing a coherent foreign policy blueprint for a 
liberated South Africa. The Constitutional Guidelines merely hints that lISouth Africa shalf 
be a non-aligned state committed to the principles of the Charter of the United Natibns and 
to the achievement of national liberation, world peace and disarmament ll • 2 The United 
Nations' Declaration on Apanheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa of 
1989, for its part, also dimly proclaims that lIa democratic South Africa shall respect the 
rights, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, 
friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples 11 • 3 The first few drafts of 
the ANC's RDP are even more vague on foreign policy matters. 
Suffice it to say here that in the challenging game of international relations with its 
high stakes of balance of power diplomacy, spheres of influence, and complex 
;;; 
interdependence in an essentially self-help, Western dominated international system, the 
ANC's foreign policy declaration, that liThe democratic South Africa will therefore move 
away from the position asserted by the white, minority regime, that South Africa must be 
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recognised as a dominant regional power",4 sounds like the blank lyric: 'Don't follow, I will 
not lead; don't lead, I will not follow. Just walk beside me, share my journey, and hope for 
the best.' 
It need hardly be noted, that the demands and challenges of the foreign policy of a 
liberation movement differs quite fundamentally from conducting international affairs in a 
mixed-actor system in which the state is the primary actor. The two obviously differ 
fundamentally and should therefore not be confused. In other words, it is going to be 
important for an ANC led government to seriously adapt to changing circumstances in the 
post-Cold War world. 
Of the abundance of Resolutions and Plans of Action that the ANC adopted since 
1988, outlining their blueprint for the 'ideal', post-apartheid South Africa, it devoted no more 
than forty pages to foreign policy. These are serious omissions because it cannot just be 
assumed that South Africa's foreign policy will take care of itself, and that a liberated South 
Africa will naturally fulfil its potential role and assume its rightful place within the 
community of nations. As the Nigerian statesman Obafemi Awolowo avowed, "We would 
be deluding ourselves if we imagined that size, population and natural resources are all that 
are required to boost us into a position of eminence and leadership".5 What is more, in 
South Africa's case we are dealing with " ... the nation in search of its identity, the people in 
search of material satisfaction, and the state in search of its security. ,,6 
The survival, prosperity and security of a nation, it should be pointed out, is critically 
dependent on, and partially determined by, the nature and dynamics of the foreign policy 
orientation and national role conceptions that the state articulates and identifies for itself. 
Holsti rightly observes in this regard that foreign policy orientation and national role models 
are fundamental sine qua nons if the state is to accomplish its domestic goals. 7 
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It is pivotal that coherent, constructive and concrete foreign policy orientations and 
national role strategies for South Africa beyond apartheid be analyzed, developed, and 
constructed. Now that South Africa's rightful p~s~iion in the world is finally restored and 
altered with the eventual removal of apartheid and white minority domination, the "new 
democratic republic" will suddenly and effectively be challenged and thrust into a responsible 
r - • 
and demanding role, and there will not be any escape from this challenge. South Africa's 
unique historical experience, its peculiar foreign affairs circumstances, and its in-built foreign 
policy facilities - economic, military and industrial - equips it for a fundamental, crucial and 
influential role in world affairs. The principle and question of involvement and commitment 
after apartheid is no longer the issue therefore. What involvements and which commitments? 
That is the question! 
1.1 The Goals of the Study 
This study is in large part a reflection of the growing domestic interest in, and indeed 
paramount concern with South Africa's future; and in particular South Africa's future 
external relations and foreign policy. These, in turn, are the products of the profound 
changes in both South Africa's domestic political map and the dynamics of the contemporary 
international political status quo post bellum. 
This thesis should essentially be considered as an exposition of the foreign policy of 
a "new", apartheid-free South Africa in a post-Cold War international arena, arguing for a 
pro-active and prudent foreign policy. An important goal of the study is to make as 
dispassionate and rational as possible a contribution to the debate on South Africa's future 
foreign policy, national roles and external relations. A further aim of the study shall be to 
deduce relevant conclusions and findings from the research, and endeavour to place the 
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results of perpetual and viable foreign policy orientations and nationat role models within the 
framework of policy alternatives to South Africa's decision-makers in the future. The fact 
that a scholarly analysis of this sort is attempted, is, at the end of the day, }n itself 
significant. 
The challenge and objective of this study is furthermore to investigate the 
viability of foreign policy postures for a post-apartheid, post-pariah South Africa on the basis 
of options and scenarios. Viable foreign policy options for the future can, after all, only be 
skilfully assessed and advanced on the basis of options and scenarios, that is to say an 
analysis of probable events that are most likely to occur and influence the future. 
Considerable thought is given to approach and format, seeking above all an 
uncluttered and condensed donation to South Africa's future international affairs. The study 
is, further afield, substantially an exploratory probe, rather than a definitive policy blueprint 
of the foreign policy of a post-apartheid South Africa. It is essentially analytical, but also 
comparative in nature. 
Turning to the list of contents, the treatise unfolds as follows: Chapter II sets Gut a 
conceptual framework for the analysis of foreign policy orientations, and national role 
conceptions; and attempts to place them within the framework of changing paradigms in 
international relations. 
Chapter III reflects on the foreign policy orientations of the apartheid past, arguing 
that if we are to understand the challenges faced by a post-apartheid South Africa, it is 
indeed important to take a longer historical view at what the orientations and strategies of the 
past intended to accomplish, and what, even with the best of intentions, they could never 
even hope to realize. 
9 
Chapter IV analyses and distinguishes between three typical foreign policy orientations 
that states in the contemporary international system normally choose from, viz isolationism 
(dissociation), permanent neutrality and non-alignment (neutralization). In assel1ing that 
,,: : 
isolation and permanent neutrality can surely be considered non-starters, the study advances 
a re-defined non-alignment as a viable foreign policy strategy for a new South Africa. Very 
importantly, the thesis argues, that unless non-alignment proves itself capable of re-
orientating itself, South Africa should seriously consider a new kind of internationalism as 
foreign policy orientation. A re-orientated non-alignment - or internationalism - is proposed 
not merely as the most feasible pro-active foreign policy strategy for a post-pariah South 
Africa, but, more importantly, as the best means to safeguard and protect the envisaged 
infant post-apartheid dispensation that is about to replace apartheid. 
Chapter V strongly argues that the establishment of a legitimate post-apartheid-
democratic order is the only way through which South Africa can hope to assert its 
international legitimacy and rehabilitate its poor standing in the world. It is of the opinion 
that a revolutionary zero sum overthrow of the apartheid order would merely serve to 
obfuscate and destroy the chances of a fIrm democracy replacing the white racial oligarchy 
and apartheid status quo; a negotiated Settlement of the apartheid dispute is, ipso facto, the 
best means of establishing and securing a "stable" and "prosperous" democracy. It believes 
that unless the South Africa government, both at present and in future, together with all 
major contending parties in the South African power struggle, effectively and speedily comes 
to grips with political instability, crime and its violent vicissitudes, it will have negative 
consequences for South Africa's foreign affairs. In fact, argues Chapter V, South Africa of 
the past has, of course, been little more than a functioning anarchy. 
Given South Africa's peculiar position in the international system, particularly its 
10 
position within the African context, Chapter VI advances a series of realistic and credible 
national role models for a post-apartheid South Africa. These are regional leader, regional 
protector, pro-active independent, defender of the "faith, regional-subsystem collaborator, 
"< 
developer, example setter, and internal developer. 
A study of this sort, risky as it may seem, is indeed necessary. 
11 
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Chapter n 
Foreign Policy Orientation, National Role Conceptions, and International Relations 
.,: -.. ~ 
Despite important changes in international relations which have broadened the range of actors, the 
r - ~ 
scope of the issues and the complexity of the processes involved, it remains the case that much 
if not most of what goes on is in fact the product of the foreign policy behaviours of one or more 
states. 
Brian White 
Finding life in a state of nature impossible, men turn to the State to find the security collectively, 
that they are incapable of finding individually. 
Kenneth Waltz 
2.1 Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Orientation 
Foreign policy orientation refers to a state's general attitudes and commitment (or lack 
of commitment) towards the international environment; it is a fundamental strategy for 
realizing its domestic and foreign policy objectives, and for coping with persisting external 
threats.} A state's general foreign policy strategy is often closely linked to the nature of its 
domestic political attitudes and socio-economic needs. The ever increasing linkage between 
domestic and external politics, said to Professor Koos van Wyk, leads to such a high level 
of penetration of domestic politics, that states cannot avoid participation in international 
affairs. 2 The international aggregation of interests, argues van Wyk, has become an 
essential part of the pursuit of foreign policy goals. Driven by an interest in survival, states 
are actually sensitive to any erosion of their relative capabilities which are the ultimate basis 
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for their security and independence in an essentially anarchical, self-help international 
arena. 3 
Professor Kal Holsti advanced a number of,e~sential provisos that should be taken into 
account when selecting and articulating a foreign policy orientation. 4 First, the models and 
patterns of dominance, subordination and leadership of the international system. These factors 
are important because they establish and set the constraints, demands and limits on the 
freedom of movement and manoeuvrability of the component units in the system. 
Second, the linkage between overall foreign policy strategy and domestic needs and 
demands -political, socio-economic, and otherwise. Foreign policy orientation, it should be 
pointed out, is every so often formulated to fulfil socio-economic needs and to advance the 
national interests of the nation. 
Third, the national decision-maker's persisting threat perception to their values and 
national interests will have a fundamental bearing on their orientation and attitudes· to the 
external environment. 
Finally, a state's geographical location, topographical characteristics, and endowment 
in natural resources are more than often linked to its choice of orientation. More important, 
the main geographic, demographic, and economic features of a state create general 
socio-economic and military needs and demands that can be fulfilled only through 
transactions and contact with the outside world. A country's distribution of natural 
resources, geographical location, and topography may indeed be the most important features, 
because they are the permanent factors. 5 These permanent conditions also have the greatest 
relevance to military and defensive eminence and policies. 
The foreign policy orientation of a state furthermore serves as a crucial frame of 
reference, a paradigm which exerts and provides a broad directional influence upon policy, 6 
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and a prism through which leaders view the outside world. 
States in the contemporary international system normally choose between three typical 
foreign policy strategies, viz. isolationism; perma[l~ju neutrality; and alignment, in our case 
non-alignment.7 The foreign policy orientation of a post-apartheid South Africa can be 
analyzed on the basis of these principles and notions of dissociation, neutrality, and 
neutralization in the international system. 
The "go it alone" and inward-looking option of isolationism, with its emphasis on 
disengagement and dissociation in international affairs, would seem to be an improbable and 
costly foreign policy option for a post-apartheid South Africa. In order for the newly 
established democracy to prosper, the new state will need, if not be compelled, to maximize 
its political, diplomatic and economic integration and co-operation with the world 
community. What is more, given its peculiar position on the now peripheralised African 
continent, it will be crucial for South Africa to adopt a pro-active, constructive foreign policy 
if it hopes to realize even the minimum demands for security and survival. 
Permanent neutrality on its part has been dealt a negative blow by the overall 
unprecedented and profound changes in the international system with its emphasis on the 
demise of the bi-polar Cold War and superpower rivalry between the United States and the 
ex-Soviet Union and their respective alliance blocs. The Cold War was, after all, the raison 
d'etre of permanent neutrality. 
Due to its alleged feasibility and viability, non-alignment has been articulated as the 
most attractive foreign policy posture for a liberated South Africa. Non-alignment as foreign 
policy orientation has as one of its major objectives the maximization of freedom of choice, 
manoeuvrability, and flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy, based on the dictates of 
national interests rather than ideological, dogmatic prescription. 8 Non-alignment is 
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furthermore being proposed by its proponents as the best means and mechanism to protect 
the infant post-apartheid dispensation and democratic political status quo ante that will 
replace the apartheid racial oligarchy of the past,~d the racial oligarchy in transition of the 
present. This depends on the ability of the orientation to adapt to new international 
circumstances and shifts in the global balance-of-power. If non-alignment proves itself to be 
incapClble to adapt to these new realities, than South Africa's post-apartheid governing elite 
will have to consider a new internationalist orientation. 
2.2 Defining Foreign Policy 
George Modelski defines foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by 
communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities 
to the international environment".9 Brian White on his part interprets foreign p'olicy as 
" ... that area of governmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the state 
and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system" . 10 White furthermore 
argues that foreign policy, just like domestic policy, is directed at (and implemented in the) 
environment and arena external to the state. For Joseph Frankel, foreign policy entails" ... the 
decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent, relations between one state 
and others" .II William Wallace again contends that foreign policy implies "a continuous 
process that bridges the analytical barriers between international and domestic political 
systems" . 12 Evans and Newnham quite correctly assert therefore that foreign policy is "the 
activity whereby state actors act, react, and interact".13 
Taken another step further, foreign policy can be said to denote that deliberate 
strategy and planned course of action developed and articulated by the decision-makers of a 
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state vis-a-vis other states and international entities. 14 It is aimed at achieving specific goals 
and objectives defined in terms of national interests ; that is to say the fundamental 
objectives and ultimate determinants that guide th~ ?ecision-makers of a state in the making 
and conduct of foreign policy. 15 The national interests of the state is typically a highly 
generalized conception of those elements that constitute the state's most vital needs. The most 
important national interests include survival, self-preservation, independence, territorial 
integrity, security and economic well-being of the state. The goals of traditional foreign 
policy, in short, has been the attempt by governments to secure and extend the physical 
control of territory, and to gain diplomatic influence over foreign governments; what could 
be dubbed here the territorial-diplomatic imperative. 
Foreign policy consequently involves a dynamic process of applying relatively fixed, 
and often rigid interpretations of national interest to the highly fluctuating and dynamic 
situational factors of the international (foreign policy) environment in order to develop a 
sustained course of action, followed by efforts to achieve diplomatic implementation of those 
guidelines and principles. 16 As Charles Kegley Jr. and Eugene Wittkopf put it, "When we 
speak generically about foreign policy and the decision routines that produce it, weare 
referring to the goals that the officials representing states seek to obtain abroad, the values 
that gave rise to those objectives, and the means and instruments through which they are 
pursued" .17 Because power is a means to realizing national interests, power, it is important 
to assert, is the main ingredient of foreign policy. 18 
The distinction between foreign policy and diplomacy is worth preserving here: while 
foreign policy refers to the substance of a state's relations with other states and agencies, 
diplomacy on its part refers to the process of dialogue and negotiations by means short of 
war. 19 As Abba Eban asserts, diplomacy can be seen as "the prevention of war when 
17 
possible, the control of its course once it has broken out, and its termination under conditions 
likely to prevent its renewal". 20 
.;: -.. 
2.3 Major Steps in the Foreign Policy Process 
Because of the dynamics and complexities of international relations and the hard 
pushes and pulls of the international system, states are confronted with constant challenges 
to pursue numerous policies, identify many goals, map out various tactics and strategies, 
evaluate different capabilities, and initiate and implement specific decisions and actions, a 
challenge that South Africa's future leaders will have to heed.21 This demanding task, 
analysts argue, must always be co-ordinated and organized within the broad framework of 
.-
national interest guidelines.22 More specifically, they argue, the major steps and procedures 
in the foreign policy process include inter alia:23 1) translating the normally vague and 
fixed interpretations of national interests into concrete goals and objectives; 2) determining 
and analysing the domestic and international situational factors related to foreign policy goals; 
3) analysing and assessing the state's capabilities for achieving its desired results; 4) 
developing a deliberate plan or strategy for using the state's capabilities and resources to deal 
with the variables in pursuit of that goal; 5) embarking on the requisite actions; and 6) 
periodically reviewing and evaluating progress made toward the achievement of the hoped-for 
results. 
It should be born in mind that the foreign policy process seldom, if ever, proceeds 
logically, smoothly, and chronologically; and because the international environment is in 
constant flux, the foreign policy process is dynamic and continuous. As Thomas Schelling 
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avowed, "foreign-affairs is a complicated and disorderly business, full of surprises, 
demanding hard choices that must be based on judgement rather than analysis, taking place 
in a world that changes so rapidly that memory, a?d experience are likely out of date" .24 
A post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy elite should take acute cognisance of 
Shelling's premonition. 
2.4 Explaining and Analysing National Roles and Role Conceptions 
The maxim, "the man makes the position", is equally pertinent to the dynamics of 
inter-state relations, and in particular for purposes of this thesis South Africa's foreign 
affairs. Because in the international system as it is some states are in much stronger 
positions than others, it follows that the weak states are more dependent on the strong. This 
equation fits the South African case well. In the global context, South Africa would'want to 
pursue friendly relations with as many states as possible; this is so because of the importance 
of trade, economic interaction and foreign aid for this country's prosperity. 
The concept of position as described above, connotes a behavioural entity -in a 
behavioural setting with more or less well defined functions, duties, rights and privileges.25 
States in the international system (like South Africa) are by and large representatives of these 
positions. If the "position makes the state", the reverse of the coin is that states articulate 
and define for themselves the rights, duties, privileges, and appropriate forms of behaviour 
associated and identified with their locations, rank, strength and prestige that will suit their 
positions in the international society. 26 Professor Holsti replaces the term position with that 
of status; status denotes more or less a rough estimate of a state's ranking in stature in the 
international system. 27 The perception of a state's status in the international system has an 
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appreciable (or less appreciable) consequence, and implication for the way policy-makers 
define their appropriate international tasks and roles for their nations.28 
What then are national role conceptions? ~ational role conceptions can be defined as 
the general foreign policy attitude and behaviour of governments.29 It includes patterns of 
positions, decisions, responses, attitudes and commitments towards other states, and outlines 
the functions and tasks which states see themselves committed to within different international 
settings. 
While foreign policy orientation reflects such factors as the structure and nature of 
the international system, threat perceptions, levels of involvement, inter alia; national role 
postures on their part reflect the basic predispositions, pledges, fears and attitudes toward the 
outside world, as well as the systemic, geographic, economic, and military proximities of 
states. 30 National roles range from high levels of involvement to very low levels of 
engagement in the international system. High levels of engagement suggest active,·radical, 
and strong features of commitment, while low levels of involvement reflect conservatism, 
passivity and weakness, according to Holsti. National roles provide guidelines for actions 
when specific situations arise in the international arena. It furthermore reflects the general 
and specific objectives governments (hope to) pursue within regional SUb-systems and in the 
international society at large. 31 
It is important to emphasise that national role conceptions, as both professors Holsti 
and Van Wyk argue, are closely linked to foreign policy orientations, and constitute foreign 
policy outputs associated, moreover, with states that are actively engaged and involved in 
systemic and regional affairs. More often than not, therefore, national roles are pro-active 
in nature. They are, however, more specific than orientations because they suggest and lend 
to more discreet foreign policy acts and outputs. 
20 
In International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, 1983, and "National Role 
Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, 14(1970), 
Professor Kal Holsti advances no less than sixteen, t~pes of national role conceptions that are 
part and parcel of the foreign policies of states. It should be pointed out that these role 
models are articulated with a specific cold war emphasis; they should therefore be revised 
and re-defined in order to make them relevant for the new post-cold war realities. Here 
follows a synopsis and synthesis of these role performances and postures. 32 
1) Liberator, Bastion of the Revolution. This role conception - pursued mainly during 
the anti-colonial revolution age - suggests that the state commits itself to organize or lead 
various types of revolutionary movements abroad. Governments see as one of their tasks the 
liberation of subjected and oppressed people in other countries and to act as the bastion of 
foreign revolutionary movements. They keenly provide an area that foreign revolutionary 
leaders can regard as physical, moral, and ideological sources of support. The question now 
arise, will South Africa pursue such a revolutionary cause abroad? If so, how will South 
Africa go about practising such a model? 
2) Regional Leader. Deriving from a state's strength and resource capabilities,- this 
role conception refers to duties and special responsibilities that a state perceives for itself in 
relation to "its" region and territorial sphere of influence. For example, will South Africa 
conduct itself as the hegemon of southern Africa? 
3) Regional Protector. With an emphasis on special leadership responsibilities on a 
regional and issue-area basis, this conception assumes an active emphasis on providing 
protection, especially military defence and security, for adjacent states, and for a region in 
general. 
4) Active Independent. Emphasising the protection of the territorial integrity, 
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sovereignty, and independence of the state, this role conception underscores the necessity and 
importance of diplomatic interaction with as many states as possible, and occasionally, to 
become involved as mediators and facilitators in (b!oc) conflict resolution. 
5) Liberation Supporter. The role of liberation supporter does not indicate formal 
responsibility for either organising, leading, or physically supporting liberation movements 
abroag. They are, more accurately, sympathizers of these movements. 
6) Anti-imperialist Agent. Especially during the Cold War era, many states saw 
themselves as agents of the struggle against the "imperial menace" fighting the "running dogs 
of imperialism" . 
7) Defender of the Faith. This role conception suggests that states view their foreign 
policy tasks in terms of defending certain values and principles, rather than specified 
territories from attack. In his inaugural speech, former U.S. President John F. Kennedy, for 
example, claimed that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any 
hardship, support any friend, or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success ofliberty". 
8) Mediator-Integrator. The theme of this role model suggests that states see 
themselves as regional and/or global "fixers", "stabilizers", and "menders". In - this 
conception, states typically see themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or 
undertaking special mediatory tasks to reconcile other states or groups of states. 
9) Regional-Subsystem Collaboration. The themes in this role conception do not 
merely envisage occasional interposition into issues or areas of conflict. Rather, they indicate 
far-reaching commitments to co-operative efforts with other states in order to establish wide 
communities, to coalesce, co-operate, mediate, facilitate, and integrate with other political 
units. 
10) Developer. The treatise in this role model suggests a special duty or obligation 
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to assist developing countries. Reference to special skills, advantages and resources for 
undertaking such continuing tasks appear prominently in the foreign policy tasks that 
governments outline for themselves. 
11) Bridge. This rather vague and ephemeral conception seems to stimulate very little 
concrete action. Because of such factors as unique geographical location or multi-ethnic 
culture, some states are in a peculiar position to create understanding among other states, or 
to act as a bridge in communication between others. 
12) Faithful Ally. The faithful-ally role model suggests that a states will support, with 
great enthusiasm and vigour, its friends and allies. The state is not so much concerned with 
receiving aid as to committing itself to giving aid and pledging assistance to others. 
13) Independent. This role conception is enunciated on the basis of the claim that on 
any given matter or issue, the state will pursue what it perceives to be its own legitimate 
interests. Other than this, it does not suggest any particular fixed tasks or functions in the 
system. 
14) Example Setter. This role conception emphasises the importance of a state 
promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by emphasising and 
portraying its domestic political dispensation as an ideal type, and by pursuing certain 
domestic policies towards national peace and co-habitation. On this score, South Africa's own 
constitutional success story put this country in an ideal position to serve as an example in 
Africa. 
15) Internal Developer. This role model does not refer to a pro-active function within 
the regional sub-system, or the international system. Instead, it suggests that most of the 
efforts of government should be directed towards domestic problem solving and internal 
socio-economic development. It often also refers to the desire to remain relatively 
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non-involved in the dynamics and complexities of international politics. 
16) Balancer. This model refers to the traditional balance of power theory. It 
suggests that the state take upon itself the duty to act as "impartial" and "vigilant" "holder 
.: . 
of the balance" ,33 so that no state can "lay down the rules to others", in Vattell's words.34 
It is mostly associated with the historical role that England came to play in the European 
dominated State system. Writing in 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe argued that it had "Become almost 
a historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of the balance 
by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side opposed to 
the political dictatorship of the strongest single state or group at any given time". 35 
Balance-of-Power has been roundly criticized for causing considerable semantic confusion. 
Ernst B. Haas36 located at least eight distinct meanings of the term; and Martin Wighr7 
was successful in tracking down no less than nine such meanings. These meanings include, 
inter alia: 1) an even distribution of power; 2) the principle that power should be evenly 
distributed; 3) the existing distribution of power; 4) the principle of equal aggrandizement 
of the great powers at the expense of the weak; 5) a special role in maintaining an even 
distribution of power; 6) the principle that one side ought to have a margin of strength in 
order to avert the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed; 7) a special advantage in 
the existing distribution of power; 8) a preponderance of power; and 9) an inherent tendency 
of international politics to produce an even distribution of power. It follows clearly here, as 
Inis Claude observed, that the problem with the balance-of-power is not that it has no 
meaning, but that it has far too many meanings.38 
The outcome of the above exposition of national role conceptions suggests plainly that 
states can pursue and perform several roles and national-role conceptions in different sets of 
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relationships simultaneously. The more pro-active a South Africa will be in international 
relations, the more role conceptions it will develop and articulate for itself. Apart from its 
pro-non-alignment posture, the ANC did not re~l1y articulate concrete postures and role 
conceptions; the jury is still out on such models. It is important therefore for us to engage 
in analysis on post apartheid role conceptions for South Africa after apartheid. 
It should be pointed out, in the first place, that given its peculiar position in the 
international system, it would be critical for a non-aligned (or internationalist) post-apartheid 
South Africa to adopt and apply a number of national role conceptions. The more realistic, 
feasible and critical conceptions that are being proposed here are: 
1) Regional Leader 
2) Regional Protector 
3) Pro-Active Independence 
4) Mediator-Integrator 
5) Regional-Subsystem Collaborator 
6) Developer 
7) Internal Developer 
8) Example Setter 
2.5 International Relations and the New World Order 
Because this study is future-oriented and concerned with the international affairs of 
a post-apartheid South Africa, a very important question comes to mind and needs serious 
consideration: What is the objective nature of the world; the emerging 'new world order', 
that will confront a post-pariah South Africa? 
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Long before South Africa's first universal franchise elections the ANC observed in 
response to this vexed question that II ... the conduct of ... foreign policy must take into account 
the realities of contemporary international rela!ionsll.39 IIA democratic South Africa's 
". . 
foreign policy II , the ANC maintained, II will further be influenced by the emergence of a New 
World Orderll.40 These statements clearly recognised the importance of comprehending the 
evolving "new world order" which is still in ~state of flux; in fact, it may take a decade or 
more before the concrete principles of this order emerges. 
The study of international relations implies, by definition, the examination of the 
interaction between actors across national frontiers. 41 This point is made here because it 
is important to stress that sovereignty of the new, democratic South Africa will reside in its 
government, not in some foreign entity such as the UN. 
As a field of inquiry, international relations studies the distribution of power and" 
influence on a global scale and the interplay between and among power centres.42. "South 
Africa is about to become such a centre of power on the world stage; during the apartheid 
era this country's offensive domestic policies subtracted substantially from this country's 
ability to become an influential and important actor. 
Not so long ago Hans Morgenthau defined international politics, indeed all politics, 
as a perpetual struggle for power. 43 Because international relations is about power, 
suggested Raymond Platig, the substantive core of international relations is the interaction 
of governments of sovereign states.44 A democratic South Africa will be in a position to 
interact with much more foreign governments than the apartheid government could ever hope 
to have dealings with. In other words, with the end of apartheid the problem with South 
Africa's foreign policy will be resolved. 
However, South Africa's new government wont be the only actor engaging in the 
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country's foreign affairs; non-state actors such as multi-national corporations, the business 
community, academic institutions , churches, to mention a few, are increasingly becoming 
involved in foreign affairs; this is incidentally a global trend. Far from being an ~xc1usive 
.;: -.. 
and strict "state centric" arena, therefore, state actors have come to share the Western 
dominated international stage with an ever-growing variety of non-state actors (NSA's), 
making the world stage essentially a 'mixed actor' arena. 
However, it should be stressed that while this tide clearly increases the complexity 
of the international environment, the state (governments) still appears to dominate the global 
theatre of western hegemony. 
Because of this tension between state and non-state actors, two contending types of 
paradigms in international relations are busy emerging; these paradigms could be considered 
approaches to the conduct of international affairs that South Africa will have to realistically' 
take cognisance of: viz. realism and interdependence. 
Impressed by the levels and persistence of discord in world politics, political realism 
came to perceive international relations as an endless struggle for power45 and survival in 
an essentially anarchic and hostile environment. In rather pessimistic terms realists depicted 
international relations as a Hobbesian state of war; a "dog eats dog" world; a world full of 
bulldogs and puppies; a world where the fittest and the toughest are more than likely to 
survive at the expense of the small and weak. At first glance realism seems a somewhat 
narrow perspective of world affairs and the new South Africa certainly does not face such 
a bellicose type situation. The end of the cold war had the implication that typical hot wars 
between states are less likely to occur in future. This should not be taken as an argument that 
wars are obsolete; instead it is an assertion that competition between states will now shift to 
different terrains such as the economic field. 
27 
But realists will persuasively maintain that international anarchy, that is to say the 
absence of an over-arching world authority, fosters conflict and competition amongst the 
principal actors, states, and seriously impinges on their willingness to co-operate, ev~n when 
.;: -.. 
they share common interests. 46 South Africa will in future discover that in spite of the 
restoration of its political legitimacy, that is not likely to transfer into benefits for its 
economic relations with other states at all time. It will sometimes perceive its economic 
interests to be threatened by other states as is the case with its belated participation in the 
Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
What came to be branded the traditional paradigm of international relations, viz. 
realism, still does have some relevance in the new post-cold war age. Realism is based on 
a number of assumptions and propositions found in realist theory47 which is worth' bearing 
in mind when considering a new, post-apartheid foreign policy posture for South Africa:' 
first, states in a "state-centric" system are the foremost actors in world politics. Second, 
domestic politics can be clearly separated from foreign policy. As Henry Kissinger avows, 
"the domestic structure is taken as a given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy 
ends" .48This is an a realist assertion that can be contested; it could be argued that domestic 
politics and foreign policy is closely linked and intertwined and that the two influences each 
other greatly. This was the case with South Africa's unavailing foreign policy experience 
during the apartheid years. Third, argue the realists, states are preoccupied with power, and 
international anarchy (or absence of authority) is the principal force shaping the motives and 
objectives of states. Fourth, the international environment severely penalizes states' if they 
fail to protect their vital national interests. Fifth, there are gradations of capabilities among 
states, greater powers and lesser powers in a decentralized system of states possessing (only) 
legal equality and sovereignty. All states are equal therefore, but some are more equal than 
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others. Six, states are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to co-
operate even in the face of common interests. Finally, the "national interest", the realist's 
"iron law" of international politics, is defined in terms of power to the virtual exclusion of 
.;: -.. 
all other factors, such as the promotion of ideology and in particular utopian principles. The 
nature of the anarchical international society, argues the realist, necessitates the acquisition 
of military capabilities sufficient at least to deter aggression and attack. The best means of 
self-preservation, according to the realists, is a vigilant and constant awareness and 
reiteration of the worst-case scenario. Once again we see in realism an obsession with power; 
political realism surely constitutes a pessimistic and dreary assumption of international 
affairs. 
Not only for the boldness with which realists came to state their propositions, but also' 
because of the visible trends towards co-operation between states, interdependence49 
observers vigorously tried to belie and dispel the realist depiction of world politics as a 
Hobbesian "state of war" and a struggle of all against all. Interdependence theorists argued 
that states are interdependent, that is to say they are involved in situations characterized .by 
reciprocal effects between themselves, in strategic, social, ecological, and economic areas.50 
With its attention fixed on the economic dimensions of statecraft, interdependence is a 
refutation of the belief that international politics is a seamless web of power interests, a 
state-bound "billiard ball" scenario, infused with anarchy, whose actors are driven by a 
perpetual search for a military defined security. 
The interdependence paradigm, with its claim of a fundamental shift in the allocation 
of power within the international system, is grounded on three main pillars.51 Firstly, the 
utility and fungibility of military force is becoming obsolete in international relations. 
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Secondly, the existence of economic relations, rather than militaiy relations, assume the 
defming role in international affairs. Thirdly, international regimes, and not the state, are the 
governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence. 52 On this score, 
.. : -.. 
interdependence theorists would argue that it will be important for South Africa to join 
international regimes and organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), the GATT, etc. The assertion of the interdependence school is that 
international regimes help breed a common interpretation of events, and in so doing 
manipulate state actions by redrawing their particular interests into line with the interest of 
the international system. 53 
In interdependence, a cobweb paradigm replaces the "billiard ball" paradigm of 
realism; South Africa could derive great benefits from the cobweb. Indeed, the new surge 
in interdependence led one of the principal exponents of 'cold eyed' realism, Henry' 
Kissinger, with his deeply rooted belief in realpolitik and classical balance-of-power politics, 
to assert that "the traditional agenda of international affairs - the balance of powers, the 
security of nations - no longer defines the perils or possibilities in international affairs. Old 
patterns are crumbling, old slogans are uninformative". The world, said Kissinger, _has 
become interdependent in economics, communications, and human aspirations. 54 For the 
interdependentists, therefore, international relations is at best "les loups ne se mangent pas 
entre eux"; that is to say, it is not a jungle out there. Based on the realist assumption, 
therefore, it would surely be a decidedly risky business to come out strictly in defence of the 
realist paradigm in international relations. The world, some interdependent scholars 'would 
heap, is becoming a safer place. 
Alas, not quite. In spite of the very important and indeed necessary trends towards 
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interdependence and the alleged decline in the utility of force, the anarchic nature of the 
international system suggests that the world is still a "dangerous", and especially "selfish", 
place, as US president Bill Clinton argued; in such an arachic world, each state is forced to 
cater for itself; it cannot depend to much on foreign largesse to guarantee its prosperity and 
safety. Because of the persistence of anarchy, there is still no over-arching authority to 
r 
prevent other states from using violence or the threat of violence to destroy or enslave 
others. 55 
In the anarchical arena violence will still occur exactly because "there is nothing to 
prevent them", as Waltz puts it.56 Violence will not always take on the inter-state form but 
will shift increasingly to the intra-state level as is illustrated by so-called imploding states 
such as Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and the former Yugoslavia to mention a few. Given the 
realities and nature of anarchy, individual well being is not necessarily the key interest of 
states. Instead, survival is likely to emerge as a core and primary concern of all states;57 
states will seek, as an important priority, the maintenance of their position in the international 
system. As Raymond Aron claims, "politics - insofar as it concerns relations among states, 
seems to signify -in both ideal and objective terms - simply the survival of states confronting 
the potential threat created by the existence of other states". 58 Hedley Bull also asserted 
that the anarchical international society consists of members who distrust one another and 
spend most of their time, if not actually attacking one another, at least protecting themselves 
from attack.59 Similarly, Robert Gilpin countenanced, in the world as it is, "anarchy is the 
rule; order, justice and morality are the exceptions".60 Thus, some states may be ·driven 
by justice and morality; by co-operation and friendship; some may sometimes be driven by 
greed or ambition; but anarchy and the danger of war still causes all states to be motivated, 
in some measure at least, by fear and distrust. Hence the notion here of "armed peace", or 
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as Kenneth Waltz contended, "the skilful non-use of force". 61 Put differently, in the world 
as it is, the modus operandi of statecraft is 'prepare for the worst but hope for the best'; or 
as the old saying goes, si vis pacem, para bellum. . 
Put in yet another way, in a world of scarce resources and conflict over the 
distribution of those resources, states confront one another ultimately. In the Western 
dominated anarchical arena international relations continue to be a recurring struggle for 
wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy. 62 The foundation of all 
international political life still is "conflict groups"; it still is the state. 
Because of this reality some adhere to the assertion that, because war is armed 
conflict among states, the abolition of the state must necessarily mean the end of war. 63 
The fact of the matter is, however, that there is no evidence suggesting that the world is 
moving "beyond the state system". 64 The state system is "neither in decline, nor obsolete,' 
nor dysfunctional" . 65 For Robert Jervis, therefore, all the problem of international relations 
boils down to an unfortunate dilemma: "The central theme of international relations is not 
evil but tragedy. States often share a common interest, but the structure of the situation 
prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation. ,,66 
Because of anarchy, international society still nurtures conflict and competition 
between states; it still seriously inhibits their ability and willingness to co-operate. 
The irony and the paradox of international relations, therefore, is that the state is at 
once the greatest source of violence and conflict; and the greatest source of relative stability, 
well being, and security. 
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2.6 Power and International Relations 
This brings us to another essential and indispensable theme in international relations: 
'": -.. 
Power. Translated specifically into terms of this thesis, the question could be asked, what 
is South Africa's power?; how strong is South Africa?; what are the capabilities of South 
Africa to realise its foreign policy goals? 
In this anarchical world, the arbiter of things political is to a great extent determined 
by the power of a state (South Africa); when we talk about power here we talk about power 
at home and power abroad. All noble goals, all moral and utopian schemes, will come to 
very little if this basic point is forgotten. 67 Anarchy, and the overall absence at the global 
level of adequate institutions and procedures for resolving conflict, compared and contrasted 
to most domestic political systems, makes the power factor in international relations more-
obvious, relevant, and consistent than any other element. 
But what is this greatly evocative concept power? Power has been roundly defined 
as the ability to move individuals or collections of people in some desired fashion, through 
II persuasion , purchase, barter, and coercion ll • 68 For Arnold Wolfers, for instance, power 
connotes "the ability to move others or get them to do and not to do what one does not want 
them to do. ,,69 
Power has furthermore been perceived as an influence relationship; that is the ability 
of one actor to induce another to act in some desired fashion, or conversely to refrain from 
such undesired behaviour. Professor Kal Holsti portrayed power as a multi-dimensional 
concept consisting of 1) the acts by which an actor (South Africa) influences other actors, 
2) the capabilities utilized for these purposes, and 3) the response and reactions solicited.70 
Holsti's definition furthermore views power as "the general capacity of a state to control the 
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behaviour of others" .71 Jeffrey Hart on his part measured power in terms of: 1) control over 
resource, 2) control over actors, and 3) control over events and outcomes.72 Combining 
all the points above, it is possible to offer a working definition of power as follow,s:73 
-: -.. 
Power can be said to operate in international affairs when actor "X" (South 
Africa) is able to convert its resources into influence producing a pattern of 
behaviour in actor "Y" desired by "X". 
It is not the premise of this thesis to suggest that power and security are the sole, or 
even the most important, objective of South Africa or other states. Least of all is it an 
attempt to discard the paramount importance of co-operation and interdependence, and of 
conflict resolution and peace-building in international relations. Instead, it is merely the' 
advancement of the argument that in reality and in practice, most, if not all international 
relations are a mixture of realism and interdependence and most international relations lie 
disorderly somewhere between the two. We can dub this phenomenon real interdependence, 
a point often overlooked by international relations scholars. 
The substance of this treatise on power is merely a recognition of the fact that in an 
anarchical, hostile, and selfish international society, survival is the prime motivation of 
states, and power is the ultimate means to this end.74 Put another way, without the state's 
capacity to ensure its survival, all other goals and values are threatened. According to 
Kegley, Jr. and Wittkopf, "if this image derived from realpolitik is accurate, then foreign 
policy making consists primarily of adjusting the state to the demands of strife and struggle, 
and accommodating it to the pressures of a world system that remains permanent in its 
essential features. ,,75 
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2.7 The New World Order and a democratic South Africa 
Since 1945, especially with the emergence of the Cold War, the internation~ society 
'": -.. 
has undergone uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental experiments and 
associations of states were evolving and exploring ways to deepen co-operation and friendship 
in order to ease some of the more contentious features of state sovereignty and nationalistic 
rivalries in and between states. One thinks here of the European Community's (BC) (now 
European Union) experiment in supra-nationalism; the Southern African Development 
Co-Ordination Conference's (SADCC) quest for regional co-operation and interdependence, 
for example. 
Conversely, however, unrestrained new assertions of nationalism and reaffirmations 
of sovereignty continue to spring up internationally. Here we are reminded of the" 
implications of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, with intra-state cohesion-being 
threatened by fierce ethnic, religious, social, cultural, or linguistic strife, posing a grave 
threat to societal peace, such as the enigmas of Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and 
South Africa during the apartheid era. These are forces and tensions that have for long been 
held in check by the Cold War balance "of terror. In South Africa, for example, the US and 
its allies have long viewed the apartheid problem through the cold war's East-west 
ideological prisms rather than a racist problem in its own right. It si only when racism 
became recognised for the destructive force it is, and apartheid and white supremacism were 
being dismantled, tat the western powers start to change their attitude in dealing with the 
apartheid problem. 
Today we see new tensions of ethnicity and identity are rising and finding expression 
in violence and bloodshed. These are both sources and consequences of conflict suggesting 
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that we are, in fact, heading for a post-cold war re-tribalization of international society. 
While the ancient regime of the Cold War had a set structure to it, the dismantling of the 
dreary possibility of all out war and mutual assured destruction, or MAD-ness as it is 
popularly known, provided an opening for the violent forces kept in check by the Cold War. 
In order to grapple with these new challenges therefore, it is crucial that the respect 
for the integrity of the state and sovereignty on the one hand, and nationalism and the quest 
for self-determination of peoples on the other, are not viewed as opposing trends, doomed 
to conflict and reaction. While it is critical to have a strong sense of nationhood, in order 
to affect a more harmonious international society, respect for democratic principles and 
fundamental human rights are all-important sine qua nons for peaceful co-existence in the 
international community of nations. As United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, 
Boutros-Boutros Ghali, puts it, "our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each, 
while finding a balanced design for all. ,,76 
In short, the jury is still out on whether it is possible to build a more harmonious 
society other than the conventional nation-state. After all, the decline of the primacy of the 
state is in the eye of the beholder! 
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Chapter ill 
South Africa's Crisis of Manoeuvrability: The Foreign Policy Orientations and Role 
Models of the Past 
"History repeats itself' and "History never repeats itself' are about equally true... We never 
know enough about the infinitely complex circumstances of any past event to prophesy the" future 
- by analogy. 
G.M. Trevelyan 
When I want to understand what is happening today or I try to decide what will happen tomorrow, 
I look back. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
In order to understand the foreign policy challenges faced by South Afric~, ... and 
develop concrete and sustained scenarios for the future, we need to take a longer historical 
view at what the foreign policy strategies and manoeuvres of the past intended and meant to 
accomplish, and what, even with the best of intentions, they could never accomplish. As the 
Churchillian dictum goes, '[t]he farther backward you can look, the farther forward you are 
likely to see.' 
Will South Africa's future foreign policy also be circumscribed by its domestic 
policy? In the analysis of foreign policy making the Aussenpolitik school of foreign policy 
argues that states conduct their external policies for strategic reasons and self-interests 
purposes, primarily as a consequence of the dynamics of international sways and drives, and 
not for further domestic ends. 1 For Kissinger, for example, the domestic structure is a 
given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.2 If this is true, than South 
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Africa's domestic policies in future will have little bearing on the country's foreign policy. 
The lnnenpolitik school of foreign policy, on the other hand, asserts that international 
politics and domestic politics affect one another greatly.3 Throughout the ages, arg~ed Otto 
.: -.. 
Nintze for example, pressure from without has been a determining influence on internal 
structure.4 In similar fashion, Raymond Platig asserts that lIinternational relations penetrates 
as deeply into the internal life of a nation as is necessary to understand the actions of the 
government and other nationally based actors in a multinational political system. 1I5 Henry 
Kissinger is more on the spot therefore when he contends that lito some extent, of course, 
every society finds itself in an environment not of its own making and has some of the main 
lines of its foreign policy imposed on it. 116 If one subscribes to the innenpolitik notion of 
foreign policy, than it is true that South Africa's domestic cohesion - or lack of cohesion -
will in future greatly influence its foreign policy and international standing. 
Unlike the conventional Aussenpolitik proposition that domestic politics can be· clearly 
separated from foreign policy, it will be countenanced here that domestic politics and foreign 
policy are, in fact, inextricably intertwined. Within any state, there exists both a casual and 
a causal relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy; this point is vividly 
demonstrated by South Africa's pro-apartheid foreign policy. 
Domestic politics influence foreign policy and foreign policy, in turn, influences 
domestic policy. As Charles Beard asserts, IIhowever conceived in an image of the world, 
foreign policy is a phase of domestic policy, an inescapable phase ll • 7 Kegley Jr. and 
Wittkopf, on their part, states that II ... the domestic and systemic sources of state's foreign 
policies remain ultimately linked, much as two rails of a railroad track are tied together in 
pursuit of a common goal ... 11. 8 Barber and Barratt quite correctly contend in this regard that 
"the question in foreign policy analysis is not whether domestic affairs are to be examined, 
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but rather how much attention should be paid to them, what sectors are to be investigated, 
and in what depth" . 9 
The history and nature of South Africa's post-World War II external relations, as 
argued above, highlights the peculiar intimate relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign policy quite vividly; in fact, "it has become a truism to say that South Africa offers 
one of the clearest examples of the interplay between domestic and foreign policies" .10 This 
interplay between domestic and foreign affairs was so strong and obvious in South Africa's 
case that the overall substance of its foreign policy became, by and large, a product and a 
prisoner of apanheid and its internal ramifications. South Africa's manoeuvrability and 
freedom of movement in the international society was so severely circumscribed by the 
apartheid dispute and conflict, that its foreign policy became, for all intents and purposes, ' 
obscurum per obscurium; that is to sayan obscure foreign policy by an even more obscure 
domestic policy. South Africa's foreign policy was in fact a major pillar supporting the 
system of apartheid and white minority rule, and the defence of apartheid had become the 
single, overarching function of South Africa's foreign policy in the pastY The Republie's 
conception of national security, too,' became synonymous with the preservation and 
perpetuation of apartheid: apartheid and security were little more than two sides of the same 
coin. 12 In South Africa's case, it is clear, foreign policy began at home. Both Innenpolitik 
and Aussenpolitik considerations and analyses are relevant for the South African case 
therefore. 
But why was South Africa's domestic policy of apartheid considered to be such an 
affront in international society? To be sure, South Africa was by no means the only state 
in the international society deeply divided by race. 13 Virtually all nation-states, or more 
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properly state-nations, can be considered "confederations of tribes". Juxtaposed with this is 
the phenomenon that the overwhelming majority of states in the contemporary world are by 
nature pluralistic mosaics, made up of diverse racial; cultural, ethnic, and religious :'conflict 
.,: -.. 
groups" . Stemming from this reality, racial divisions and conflicts are key factors in the 
political and social maps of many, if not most states in the contemporary world, and are 
every so often great sources of bloodshed and loss of life. 14 
The domination of one ethnic or cultural group over others is, equally, not an 
uncommon phenomenon. IS However, while South Africa is certainly not alone in the league 
of states troubled by racial tensions, the South Africa dispute in the past, in which white's 
quest for security, prosperity and lebensraum to the virtual detriment of all other groups 
featured prominently, had special qualities which made it rather unique. 
The observation that South Africa is the only country in the post-United Nations' 
Charter era that was gutsy enough to blatantly institutionalize racial discrimination, and'based 
political, indeed all participation in - or for that matter exclusion from - society on racial 
criteria, are symbolic characteristics of what Deon Geldenhuys labelled a "pigmentocracy" 
or an "albinocracy"; R.J. Vincent used the concept pigmentational sovereignty. 16 . The 
National Party's (NP) 1948 social engineering of "separate development" or apanheid 
officially split the South African popUlation into four main racial categories: Whites, Asians, 
"Coloureds", and Blacks, with Whites constituting no more than 14 per cent of the total 
population. The strategies and policies of apartheid comprised legislation controlling and 
dictating virtually all aspects of the social, political, and economic lives of these groups. 
Places of residence, property, movement, social and recreational amenities, educational 
facilities, rights of association and dissociation, and of course, the franchise, were all divided 
along racial lines, thereby securing a virtual monopoly of power, political and otherwise, for 
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whites. 17 
With the formal institutionalization of apartheid and the politics of "pigmentation" in 
1948, South Africa found itself starkly contra bones mores with the new inter:national 
-,: -.. 
morality and law of self-determination and equality of peoples that characterised the post-
United Nations Charter world. I8 
From 1948 onwards, the stark elevation of apartheid into a symbol of white survival, 
white supremacy and white security made South Africa's degradation into international 
unpopularity and eventual exile inevitable. The question was not whether, but when that 
collapse would come. 
The formal induction of apartheid in 1948 coincided with profound changes and 
immense alterations in the western dominated international society; these changes were 
spurred on by the anti-colonial and liberation revolutions by people of colour throughout the' 
globe. 
Two crucial points should be stressed at this here. Firstly, white supremacism and 
domination of "people of colour", had by this time long been a glorified European preserve. 
What is more, this peculiarity was considered and hailed by many in the European world-as 
a normal and acceptable state of affairs; In fact, one of the great constants of international 
history, at least since 1492 with Christopher Columbus' voyages, has been the perpetual 
predominance of white racism. 19 Domination has for long been associated with the 
privileged position of the 'white man'. As Lothrop Stoddard avowed, the basic factor of 
human affairs was "not politics, but race": the great enterprise of the discovery 'of the 
Americas by Columbus in 1492, the Pax Romana of antiquity, the Civitas Dei of the 
medieval Christian Commonwealth, and the European Concert of nineteenth-century balance-
of-power diplomacy, as well as the twenty-years order of the inter-war period in the early 
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twentieth century. 20 The notion of the Western-dominated international order and the 
privilege standing of the white race were, therefore, inextricably linked. Peoples of colour 
everywhere suffered the label and stigma of inferior - in fact uncivilized - status. White 
racial superiority and prejudices played crucial parts in the age of European ascendancy and 
supremacy. In fact, argued Christopher Thorne, "in one of its vital aspects, the Pacific War 
of 1941 to 1945", the major high-water mark for European domination, lIwas a racial war": 
The European powers became greatly concerned about the implications and ramifications for 
white predominance, and sought to avert the coalition of Asian powers against a White 
dominated world order.21 But than came the watershed; the Second World War was not 
only a battle against Axis military aggression. It was also purportedly a war fought for the 
values of human dignity: human rights, equality, reason and decency; it was a war fought 
between -European human values of dignity on the one hand, and authoritarianism and 
aggression on the other. 22 
Secondly, by the time of the Second World War, South Africa had long enjoyed a 
history of racism and struggle for power by whites; there was nothing new about South 
Africa's preposterous racial politics in 1948. If anything, apartheid was not mistake!} .but 
indeed a positive and deliberate affirmation of this state of affairs. 
The expansion of the international society reached a climax by the end of the Second 
World War, by which time it became apparent that European hegemony of international 
affairs and domination of the outside world was clearly threatened. 23 The new global 
international system, while still grudgingly and stubbornly evolving at the time, was being 
shaped and moulded less by Europeans, and more by the oppressed subjects allover the 
world. 24 The black states of Africa, Latin America, and Asia started to through of the 
colonial yoke; they came to take their place alongside European states, not merely as 
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participants but as legitimate members of the transformed international society, accepting its 
roles, institutions and rules of the game. These "winds of change" were to have serious 
implications for the white ruled republic in the south. 
The revolt against Western dominance and hegemony boldly manifested itself in the 
new coalition of Third World States with their strong anti-colonial and pro-national 
liberationist posture; in the ensuing years these states came to spearhead the anti-apartheid 
campaign against South Africa. Their struggle for liberation comprised five assertive shapes 
or themes as elucidated by Hedley Bull in The Expansion of International Society.25 First, 
there was what can be depicted as the struggle for equal sovereignty. This was the battle of 
those states which retained their formal independence, but enjoyed only a subordinate or 
inferior status, to achieve equal rights and status as sovereign states. 
Secondly, there was the anti-colonial revolution, by which is meant the strife of 
African, Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific peoples for formal political independence-from 
European and American colonial rule and hegemony. The premium given to the principle 
of national self-determination by Lenin in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, the 1919 Paris 
Peace Settlement, and United States President, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in. the 
inter-war period, certainly disturbed the colonial system. 
Moreover, the revolution that toppled the colonial arrangement in the non-Western 
world belongs chiefly to the post-1945 era: The Asian colonial dependencies became 
independent for most part in the late 1940's and 1950's, and the African territories in the 
1960's and 1970's. With the final collapse of the Portuguese empire in southern Africa in 
1974-5, the era of classic European colonialism and hegemony formally ceased to exist, and 
the anti-colonial movement was left with two further targets: white minority rule in southern 
Africa and Jewish rule in Palestine. 
49 
Thirdly, there has been the struggle for racial equality, or more precisely the fight 
of peoples of colour in the non-Western states against white supremacism. The solidarity of 
non-European states against whites has been one 'of the primary forces making for the 
--: -.. 
cohesion and coalition of the Third World states and movements. 
Fourthly, there has been the battle for economic justice. It was especially during the 
1960's that avowed economic objectives attained pride of place and foremost priority in the 
agenda of the Third World movement. The next battleground was therefore on the economic 
front. The quarrel between Western and Third World countries clearly asserted that the rich 
had an important stake in the underdevelopment and exploitation of the poor; and the poor 
in the further development of the rich. Hence the familiar phrase, '[t]he rich gets richer, 
while the poor gets even poorer'. 
Fifthly, there has been the quest for what has been branded cultural liberation and-
emancipation: the strife of the Third World people to throw off the intellectual and cultural 
yoke of the Western world so as to assert an imprint of their own identity and autonomy in 
the world. 
Clearly, in this new dynamic zeitgeist, apartheid, with its glorification of racial 
exclusiveness and white supremacism, and its staunch moral weakness, was bound to become 
a great bone of contention. The newly independent states of Africa in particular, and the 
Third World in general, quickly moved into the vanguard of attempts to ostracize and isolate 
South Africa, and swiftly moved to label colonialism and apartheid the "twin evils". In the 
popular sense, in fact, Africa and the rest of the Third World's handling of the apartheid 
dispute has assumed a kind of unity and solidarity rarely demonstrated in international 
affairs. When Toura Gaba stated that "the African continent is shaped like a question mark, 
and at the same time like a pistol pointed as if by chance towards the Union of South 
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Africa," he was illustrating this unity and solidarity. Having emerged victoriously from the 
struggles of European colonial domination, carried to their heights and depths against 
apartheid and white domination in southern Africa, -Africa appeared as a seething ~ea and 
.: -.. 
a battle ground against white domination. In a true sense, Africa was unified by its goals 
and needs: the drive towards self-government and independence, the quest for economic 
emancipation and independence, and the opposition to domination by racial discrimination -
all suggests a sense of true unity throughout the African continent. 
African unity against apartheid had such a great impact on South Africa's fate that, 
whereas South Africa enjoyed a role and influence in international affairs quite out of 
proportion to its relative strength and status in the inter-war era, after World War II, 
conversely, the beleaguered South Africa enjoyed a standing in the Western dominated world 
strictly incommensurate with its relative power. 26 As Deon Geldenhuys puts it, South-
Africa has " ... for so long and so openly been at odds with the world community that it is 
easy to overlook the fact that South Africa too once had its era of international glory. ,,27 
Sarah Pienaar succinctly summed up the South African dilemma when she states that South 
Africa indeed descended "from paragon to pariah, from a respected and active member.of 
the international community to the defensive and embattled figure it cuts today". The United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly has over the years passed resolutions condemning and 
criticizing the policies and practices of Pretoria, branding apartheid "a crime against the 
conscience and dignity of mankind" and a "threat to international security" .28 The high-
water mark of this sustained campaign occurred in 1977 when the UN Security councii voted 
in favour of implementing a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa, the first time that the 
Security Council had undertaken such action against a member state under Chapter 7 of the 
UN Charter. Apartheid, in fact, became the world's foremost morale contra mondus, uniting 
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the world community in ways never encountered before, and the Republic became firmly 
established and entrenched as the world's foremost pariah.29 To quote Professor 
Geldenhuys: 
-,: -.. 
Apartheid has made South Africa the world's moral sitting duck at which 
virtually all governments, regardless of their own moral virtues, feel obliged 
to fire criticism. 30 
In similar fashion, Professor Hedley Bull observed: 
There is not a world consensus against communist oppression, or oppression 
by military governments, or of one Asian or African ethnic group by another, 
comparable to that which exists against this surviving symbol of white 
supremacism that all societies in the world, to different degrees and in 
different ways, have repudiated over the .last three decades ... While this 
should not lead us not to protest against. .. other [violations of human rights],> 
we should also recognize that it is not now possible to unite the international 
community on any other basis than that of a clear perpetuation of white 
supremacism.31 
This brings us to the greatly overlooked controversy of 'double standards' in 
international affairs. Indeed, white South Africans greatly complained in the past that the 
international community judged them by a 'hypocritical' double standard; that the world 
failed to recognise the precarious "historical predicament" in which whites in South Africa 
were caught up. The Afrikaner complained that the western world judged them to standards 
they failed to apply to others, or to themselves for that matter.32 There is, surely, an even 
greater force in the assertion that the Western powers, having ordered white South Africans 
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for so long to concede political rights, and more fundamentally, political power to the black 
majority, was asking South Africans to do something that Western societies themselves would 
not dare even consider; in so doing the international community asked them to, commit 
.~ -.. 
political suicide. Thus, the formula and crusade of universalizing one-person-one-vote and 
majority rule, which alleged Western liberals abroad so long urged the white minority in 
South Africa to practice, they argued, is one the Western world would certainly not accept 
for themselves if it were to be applied in a single world state as a whole.33 These 
contentions typically evoked the impugned question: n[w]ell, what would you do in our 
situation?n; a question normally posed with serious intent. 
Surely, South Africa's white oligarchy was not unique in denying political, economic, 
and social rights to the majority of the population over which it ruled; yet the South African 
regime long enjoyed the number one position on the hierarchy of human cruelty and' 
wickedness. 34 To be sure, no other government, whether the socialist authoritarian 
government of the former Soviet bloc, the many squalid tyrannies of Africa with their dismal 
human rights scores, the regimes of Central and South America, or for that matter the 
treatment of black people in Western countries, has been subjected to so much condemnation 
and punishment as white South Africans over apartheid. 
At first glance, it is clear, these are truly forceful contentions. Yet, this should not 
be read as a justification for the doctrine of apartheid. On the contrary, these controversies, 
if anything, only serve to highlight the continued unjust nature of the preponderant liberal 
international system and the plain hypocritical position of the Western powers in this society 
of states. Of course, double standards and hypocracy have long been part and parcel of the 
arrangements of the western dominated international society. The western powers - notably 
the US, Britain, Germany - refused to see the apartheid problem as a racist problem in its 
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own right; instead they saw it as a cold war problem which demanded cold war attention. On 
this score. South Africa typically revealed a microcosm of the macrocosm, the globe: just 
as the white minority in the republic faced the challenge and inevitable prospect of ultimately 
having to come to terms with the black majority, so the Western states within the 
international society, who have long enjoyed a position of privilege and dominance, faces the 
prospect of eventually having to come to terms with the Third World majority.35 In this 
regard, apartheid has been little more than a drawn out attempt by the South African white 
minority elite to force a closer association with the dominant position of the Western minority 
in the world. 36 
In the end, this greatly fragmented international community became truly united 
against the avowed perpetuation and survival of white supremacism and racism. In a world 
conscious and concerned about white minority domination, the transgression of apartheid was' 
little more than a grave injustice and insult to black people. These transgressions made the 
errant white minority "more of an outlaw - to be hunted down to face international 
justice" .37 Peter Vale went on to liken South Africa's international relations and position 
to "a kind of bywoner; a tenant called frequently and angrily to account for its lease" .3~ -In 
the words of former Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Gerhard de Kock, "South 
Africa is a member of the club, but cannot use its facilities. ,,39 
The dilemma of South Africa's unavailing political expediency abroad, therefore, was 
not a "naive", "ill natured", and "cruel" international community. Rather it was its 
obnoxious domestic policy of apartheid and white supremacism that secured for South' Africa 
its poor standing in the new international society of states. 
It should furthermore be noted that a country's foreign policy seldom undergoes 
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abrupt, dramatic change and manoeuvres. A nation's foreign policy, instead, should be 
marked more by continuity than change. Far from having been a smooth, inexorable and 
solid process, however, close investigation reveals-the abortive, haphazard, and defensive 
-: 
nature of South Africa's foreign policy experiments of the past. In a desperate quest for 
friends and allies in a hostile world that sought to eradicate it, apartheid has inflicted severe 
constraints on South Africa's external relations that forced the country into constant 
-
manoeuvres, fluctuations, and changes. The severity of this process was clearly recognized 
by Neil Van Heerden, South Africa's former Director-General of Foreign Affairs, when he 
lamented that international rejection and condemmition of apartheid has forced South Africa 
to conduct an "underground and secretive" foreign policy and diplomacy that was executed 
"quietly and unobtrusively" .40 
South Africa's complex and bitter stanq-off with the post-UN Charter world' 
community certainly forced it to resort to undercover and behind-the-scenes foreign .. affairs 
dealings. This helps to explain why South Africa's "oligarchic-bureaucratic" foreign policy 
process was characterised more by short-range, ad hoc planning, and emergency, non-linear 
regulations and perspectives.41 
There were too many institutional and personal discontinuities and tensions in South 
Africa's decision-making process and government for its strict apartheid-oriented foreign 
policy to be defined coherently and effectively over any significant period of time. 
Fragmented institutions, plus highly personalized, rubber-stamp styles of policy and decision 
making were common practices. Foreign policy decision-making was marked by fits and 
starts, inconsistencies and incongruities, by reaction instead of anticipation, and by frequent 
panic about the process, given the illusion of continuity and movement about the process 
bec~use of the perpetual contention to stumble from one crisis to the next. 
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The foreign policy branch became, for all intents and purposes, a collection of often 
haphazardly coordinated, feuding bureaucratic fiefdoms. Pretoria, it is true, conducted a 
foreign policy process disturbingly, even dangerously-removed from both global and domestic 
-: -.. 
realities. Conflict and a high degree of disorder were intrinsic and ambiguity was the norm. 
The foreign policy making process always maximised and exacerbated the possibilities of 
surprise, costly reversals, and political embarrassment. 
South Africa's overall manoeuvrability was greatly hamstrung by apartheid and the 
republic was left with a handful of friends in an international community that seriously sought 
to fundamentally alter its structure. In its misdirected and ill-advised search for survival, 
security, and prosperity, the first major priority of successive South African administrations 
was to foster closer approximation to Western powers.42 The overriding goal was pretty 
clear-cut: liberal abroad and oppressive at home. The hope was just as obvious; an attempt 
to impress and imprint an image of the republic as a 'stable', 'prosperous', and .'secure' 
society; a paragon of the Western dominated international order, and a "[w]hite bastion of 
western civilization" on the "derelict, dark" continent of Africa. The Republic's attempts 
to assert itself as a friend of the West, in the frontline of the fight against the~'~vil 
communist empire", came to little however, as the Western powers came to realize the costly 
embarrassing prospect of becoming implicated in the defence of apartheid and white minority 
domination. Instead, the West kept Pretoria at arms length, and South Africa's association 
with the Western bloc eventually boiled down to a low-ebb, "love-hate" dualistic relationship 
at best.43 
In the wake of repudiation by the West, Pretoria's "mad elite and foreign policy 
specialists" even gambled with the idea of taking the hard-line, anti-West position, viz. 
seeking and alignment of some sort with the West's enemy number one, the Communist 
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bloc,44 a dangerous notion that starkly contradicted the Afrikaner's McCarthy-like paranoia 
and doctrine of "total Marxist onslaught". Needless to say here that Moscow's strong anti-
apartheid stance and support for the liberation movements naturally doomed the Communist-
option to failure. 
Superpower rejection forced Pretoria into the scapegoat of advocating "the neutral 
option" . 45 The threat of taking a neutral stance between the superpowers represents one of 
several typical South African ad hoc responses in its complex and fiery love-hate affair with 
the West. Rather than counting and altering their disapprobations, Pretoria instead accused 
the West of male fides and the politics of deceit,46 and moved to defy the West to do their 
damnedest. This typical attitude, if anything, only underscores the reactive and grudging 
nature of Pretoria's foreign policy and diplomacy. 
The advocacy of the neutral option seemed more of an impulsive, ad captandum, and 
defensive response to Western pressure, than a rational, considered response.47 
Pretoria even considered fixing attention to the powers in the southern hemisphere, leading 
to the illusion of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization in the diplomatic and military 
spheres. 48 Being so far removed from the states on the other side of the Southern AtlMtic, 
geo-political realities served as a great obstacle however, and very little came of the SATO 
option (this too?). 
In yet another desperate option, South African officials began to give great currency 
to the hazardous venture of a close-knit community of "outcast states", by cultivating close 
ties with its beleaguered fellow pariah brethren, Israel, Taiwan, and Chile.49 While the 
"pariah" option was also little more than an impulsive and grudging response to Pretoria's 
alienation and expUlsion from the club of Western powers, it should be noted that the 
"outcast" option actually went beyond the mere rhetorical exercise and cheap display of self-
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pity and hurt feelings vis-a-vis the West. 50 South Africa and its outcast partners 
collaborated in the economic, technological and military areas, albeit with limited benefits.51 
It was closer to home, moreover, that the "furious giant" sought to realize its foreign 
policy objectives, by using the "carrots and the big sticks" in an attempt to get its black 
neighbours to want what Pretoria wanted. A traditional aspiration and strategy of successive 
South African administrations was to begin a self-conscious exercise of regional giantism in 
the Southern and central half of the African continent in order to win friends and beat 
enemies. This quest for "sub-continental solidarity" too should be seen in the context of 
South Africa's low-ebb affairs with the Western powers. 52 
It should be remembered that Pretoria long viewed the continent as a foreign entity, 
an irritant and a threat. Only when South Africa's isolation from the Western bloc began to 
bite, was Africa grudgingly seen as an undesirable but necessary 'route' back to the West. 
Concern for stability and white security and prosperity always weighed heavily with policy 
makers, and Pretoria's seeking ofa cordon sanitaire and improved relations with Africa were 
both means to a goal, and an objective per se: a way back to the international community and 
a means out of its international isolation; and a means to survive a in a hostile and unfriendly 
world that sought to ostracize it. In the words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha: 
"Our road to the world runs through Africa" Y 
In a subtle exposition of Pax Pretoriana, South Africa used its purported economic, 
industrial, and military giantism to avowedly assert itself as a regional tour de force. With 
virtual impunity and great success every so often, Pretoria used its levers, both incentive and 
disincentive, to manipulate and frustrate the political, economic, and military vulnerabilities 
and dependence of its neighbours. 54 This constant exercise only served to unleash the 
destabilization wrangle: South Africa will punish, or conversely reward, its neighbours in 
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order to get them to do what it wanted. Professor Deon Geldenhuys went to great lengths 
to conceptualize this controversial concept: destabilization. What for a target state (this is 
the state which is, or perceives itself to be, subjected to destabilization by another) constitutes 
destabilization, argued Geldenhuys, may for the "offending" state represent no more than the 
legitimate protection of its national interests. 55 Destabilization in this regard, some would 
say, merely boils down to preemptive self-defence. Asserted Professor Geldenhuys: 
The destabilizer's primary objective is an strictly political one. Essentially, 
he wishes to promote (or force) profound political changes in the target state. 
These mayor may not involve structural change - in effect toppling the 
regime in power - but certainly involve major changes in the target state's 
policy vis-a-vis the destabilizer. The destabilizer may in addition want a 
drastic change in the target's domestic policy; this would typically require the 
target state to abandon or at least significantly, alter (whether [to] moderate 
or radicalise) its ideological leanings. 56 
The above interpretation and definition of destabilization can be strictly 
operationalized in the southern African context, in which South Africa's relations with its 
neighbours suggests deliberate attempts at destabilization. In the Southern Africa 
destabilization theatre, South Africa undoubtedly had the upper hand with its abundance of 
carrots and sticks. Some realist observers would strongly argue that Pretoria's charging bull 
diplomacy, and tough behaviour vis-a-vis its neighbours were understandable,· if not 
justifiable, because South Africa was up against antagonistic and hostile neighbours "ganging 
up" against her. Pretoria and its neighbours, they hold, were engaged in mutual and 
reciprocal destabilization at best. 
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All this controversy notwithstanding, it is clear that at the heart of the regional 
antagonism between South Africa and the states of the region and South Africa's international 
affairs in general, are South Africa's superseded domestic policy of apartheid and passe 
peculiarity of white domination. Apartheid and white domination in South Africa have for 
very long been anathema to the black states, and the international community at large, and 
r - -
charges and accusations of South Africa's subversive and aggressive destabilization of its 
neighbours only served to give Pretoria the image of bully and desperado. 57 
Unless apartheid and white domination is finally removed, therefore, South Africa's 
overall regional and international relations will remain badly incarcerated and the Republic 
will remain a quasi-outcast at best. The complete rehabilitation of South Africa's 
international relations begs for one fundamental sine qua non: the end of the outstripped 
doctrine of apartheid and white domination. As the old Gladstonian premise goes: here is 
the first principle of foreign policy: good government at home! 
There is only one last thing that remains to be said here about South Africa's 
desperate international manoeuvres and feat of Jollie de grandeur; C'est magnijique, mais ce 
n 'est pas la politi que 158 
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Chapter IV 
Isolation, Permanent Neutrality or Non-Alignment: Towards a Post-Apartheid Foreign 
Policy 
... the experience brought its disillusionment. The lady did not remain as glamorous; she did not 
even seem particularly grateful; she became demanding. And then, too, there was no secure and 
- serene place to ride to. Our castle walls had crumbled, we found ourselves living on the plain 
with everyone else. We had the problem of neighbours. And so the occasional challenge of high 
adventure became the constant and nagging problems of everyday life. 
Dean Acheson 
In order to realize its foreign policy goals, a post-apartheid South Africa will be in a position 
to choose between three typical foreign policy strategies, viz. isolationism, permanent 
neutrality, and non-alignment. 
4.1 Isolationism as Foreign Policy Strategy: A Non-Starter 
Isolationism, in its popular usage, refers to a state's deliberate avoidance of political, 
diplomatic and military commitments. As a doctrine, isolationism views the national interest 
of a state as best served by withdrawing the country from the political entanglements of the 
international community. I Proponents of isolationism typically base their arguments on the 
geographical, ideological and cultural separateness, and insulation of a state. Isolationism 
is furthermore a strategy associated with diplomatic mobility and political flexibility of the 
state following the dictum 'no permanent friends, no permanent enemies, only permanent 
interests. ,2 
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Professor Deon Geldenhuys draws an important distinction between self-isolation or 
isolationism, and enforced isolation or ostracism.3 According to Professor Geldenhuys, self-
isolation is "a protective strategy designed to shield the state against perceived _ harmful 
-: -.. 
influences from outside. ,,4 Isolationism, asserts Geldenhuys, is "a deliberate strategy, 
voluntarily pursued by a state, of restricting and continuing its international interactions and 
thereby withdrawing to a greater or lesser degree from normal international practice. "S 
Enforced isolation, on the other hand, is a "punitive measure applied against an offending 
state; it is a means by which a group of states or the international community at large exerts 
pressure on that state. ,,6 Unlike isolationism, which is voluntarily planned, enforced 
isolation is an international, punitive policy pursued by two or more states against another, 
aimed at severing or curtailing a particular state's international relations against its will. 7 
Isolationism as foreign policy orientation is a self-imposed immunization of 
involvement and entanglement in the international system. 8 It is furthermore a means to an 
end: a deliberate attempt to seal off the country against various (undesired) forms of external 
penetration and intervention.9 Isolationist strategies are often based on the premise that the 
state can best gain security and survival by reducing transactions with the outside world ·and 
building political-control walls around the home. IO 
An important qualification should be added here: states that adopt an isolationist 
posture are usually economically and socially self-sufficient, convinced that they can 'go it 
alone'. In order to maintain 'an ideal life style', such states do not feel obliged to change 
the external environment in their favour. More importantly, these states do not believe they 
depend upon others to fulfil their socio-economic needs and demands. II 
Isolationism as foreign policy strategy is particularly associated with the foreign policy 
of the United States. Mainline historians argue that United States foreign policy from 1783 
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can best be understood in terms of more or less permanent tensions between the forces of 
'isolationism' and the forces of 'interventionism' , both of which spring from the underlying 
assumptions about exceptionalism of the United States' political experience and P?sition. 12 
It was during the inter-war period, moreover, that isolationism in the United States 
was raised to the level of political dogma rather than a set of practical policy guidelines to 
-
suit a particular set of circumstances. Almost from the outset, isolationism in the United 
States was bound up and obsessed with the geographical insulation of America from the main 
centres of political activity, with its uniqueness as a 'liberal' state, and with its belief in the 
moral superiority of the American way of life.13 South Africa clearly faces a different 
foreign policy challenge; it can ill-afford to resort to a sort of hypothetical isolation from the 
African continent, for example. The DAU understa,ndably wish South Africa to playa more' 
prominent role in conflict areas such as Rwanda, Liberia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola, 
to mention a few. South Africa can resort to isolationism only at the peril of inviting hostility 
from its new Africa partners. 
Compared to the US experience, it should be stressed that there was always something 
circumstantial about America's isolationism. The high-water mark of United States 
isolationism came in the wake of the aftermath of the Great War with the Senate's rejection 
of the Treaty of Versailles and membership of the League of Nations. The subsequent 
endorsement of the policy of 'isolationism' in the 1920 election and the legislation of a 
succession of Neutrality Acts - 1935, 1936, 1937 - was evidence of the alleged consensus in 
the United States that isolationism was its general and orthodox position in world politics.14 
The notion of isolationism has aroused much debate among American diplomatic historians, 
some of whom have argued that, because of the absence of economic isolationism, the whole 
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conception of isolationism is in fact mythical.15 
In the 1930s, it became increasingly apparent in the United States that the 'head-in-
the-sand' approach of the Neutrality Acts was highly inappropriate and indeed ,counter-
'": -. 
productive to the demands of US national security and the challenges faced by a great power 
in a European dominated system dictated by a hard-core balance of power diplomacy. 16 
Doctor Ian Clark summed up the American dilemma succinctly: 
Having thrown her weight into the balance at the crucial moment in order to 
prevent German predominance, America then reverted immediately to 
continental isolation. The wish gave birth to the belief that the balance, once 
restored would remain in equilibrium. This failed to take account of the blunt 
fact that, just as her intervention had restored the balance in 1918, so her 
refusal to play a permanent role in Europe. was to leave the door open to a 
further challenge of this balance. 17 
In the words of Professor Joseph Nye, "Isolationist free riding in the inter-war period 
came back to haunt and hurt Americans by the end of the 1930s. "18 Out of this negative 
experience came a serious re-examination, by the time of World War II, of America's vital 
national interests. Out of this exercise in tum, came a realization and determination by the 
United States, however ill-conceived, to play a proper role in world affairs: to shirk no 
responsibility and to be committed. 19 
By taking cognisance of the dilemmas and of the inter-war years (what E.H. Carr so 
aptly described as 'The Twenty Years Crisis') South Africa can indeed learn from the 
American experience in 'isolationist free-riding' of a great power. If only because of the 
great expectations prevalent in some African quarters that the 'strong brother' in the south 
will come to play a pivotal anchor role in the continent, the isolationist option can most 
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certainly be considered a non-starter for a liberated South Africa. "To put it bluntly, Africa 
and a democratic South Africa need one another, and Africa in turn needs critical interaction 
with the self-interested world community. Put differently, South Africa will not ~e spared 
the hard choices that international relations in a post-apartheid, Cold War status quo post 
bellum will demand from her. Hence, South Africa should realize that it will be virtually 
impossible to stay aloof from the often leaden arena of world politics with its high demands, 
and try and judge its role and position in abstract moral terms, like a spectator watching the 
play. As the old saying goes, it is tough at the top. 
4.2 Permanent Neutrality: An Insufficient Foreign Policy Strategy 
Permanent Neutrality, unlike isolationism, is "an international legal status", asserting 
that "the independence and territory of a neutralized state are permanently guaranteed by one" 
or more other states, in return for an undertaking on the part of the neutralized 'state to 
abstain or refrain from any commitments that might lead to war."20 Hakovirta advanced 
the following working definition of neutrality: "in an international conflict, a policy is the 
more neutral the less it interferes in the conflict, the more equally it benefits or harms- the 
parties concerned, and the less it affects the outcome of the conflict. ,,21 
This modern definition of neutrality can be traced back to the Middle Ages, as it 
emerged in connection with the rise of the modern nation-state with its origins in 1648 in the 
aftermath of the Thirty Years War. 22 The original conception was one of non-participation 
by a state in a war between two or more other states and from the eighteenth century 
onwards the notion of impartiality, or equal treatment of belligerent, was added.23 These 
two important qualifications of permanent neutrality have constituted a stable and perpetual 
core, but within the post-World War II context it has been complemented and, in fact, largely 
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superseded, by a stricter political notion of neutrality as non-involvement and impartiality in 
international conflicts in general, and in the East-West bipolar rivalry in particular.24 After 
World War IT, the realities of the Cold War became, for all practical purposes, t~e raison 
d'etre of neutrality. 
The essence of permanent neutrality remains the obligation for a state not to 
participate in any future war, no matter where, when or among whom such a war may 
-
occur. 25 Permanent neutrality involves certain typical duties that include, inter alia: armed 
neutrality, territorial neutrality, neutrality from treaty obligations, and ideological and moral 
neutrality. 26 Of all these incumbencies, unwillingness to commit a state's military 
capabilities and instruments to belligerent can be considered the hallmark of neutrality. All 
these obligations and rules, it must be stressed, are applicable to, and must be observed in, 
time of both war and peace. A further qualification should also be observed: a neutralized' 
state, unlike a non-aligned state, attains its status by virtue of the actions of other states and 
there are no guarantees that its position will be honoured by others. 'rJ 
Furthermore, although most scholars use the terms 'neutralization' and 'permanent 
neutrality' interchangeably, a distinction can be drawn between them. Neutralization, 
whatever its form may be, can be regarded as a process leading to the establishment of the 
status of permanent neutrality. 28 The effect of neutralization of a state "is to support its 
military security and its political and territorial integrity". 29 Neutralization in this regard 
serves as an instrument of conflict management by insulating the state against international 
intrusion and contention. 
Although permanent neutrality is a posture that has long been guaranteed by 
international law , it finds only very limited expression and application in the contemporary 
world. Even though the proclamation of neutrality can be traced back to the United States' 
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unilateral neutral declarations in 1793, the institutionalization of permanent neutrality in 
international law began to take shape only in the early nineteenth century.30 It particularly 
reflected the case of Switzerland, whose neutral status was the fIrst to be intern,ationally 
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confIrmed and declared perpetual by the Congress of Vienna in 1815.31 The Perpetual 
Neutrality of Switzerland was later reaffIrmed by the Versailles Treaty in 1919, and by the 
League of Nations in 1933.32 
Another classic experiment in neutralization is that of lIthe self-neutralization of 
Austria".33 In 1955, the Austrian parliament adopted the Austrian Neutrality Law which 
undertook lIto practise in perpetuity a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland".34 
Although there is little to choose between Swiss and Austrian neutrality in principle, there 
are, however, signifIcant practical distinctions. Whereas Switzerland adopted a "passive 
foreign policy and active self-defence", Austria, by. contrast, pursued a "passive self-defence' 
and active foreign policies" . 35 
Hakovirta distinguishes between two further types of neutrality, viz. occasional 
neutrality and continuous neutrality without a legal basis. 36 Occasional neutrality is also 
known as temporary, ordinary, simple or ad hoc neutrality. 37 This is the neutrality 
applicable and practised in a particular war between other states. 38 The international law 
of occasional neutrality applies to any state that remains neutral in a war, regardless of its 
prior policies. Conversely, occasional neutrality in a war does not commit a state to 
neutrality in another war or to rules of conduct in peacetime. 
Continuous neutrality, also known as conventional neutrality without an international 
legal basis, is a recurrent variant of permanent neutrality. 39 States that pursue this line, 
typically tend to call their policies neutral, but fail to commit themselves to permanent 
neutrality under internationallaw.40 In the case of Switzerland, one may detect a sequential 
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shift from occasional to continuous, and eventually to permanent neutrality.41 Sweden, from 
the mid-nineteenth century onwards, is perhaps the best example of the continuous brand of 
neutrality.42 Swedish foreign policy, it would suffice to say here, is the most vaguely 
defined neutrality and lacks any established name. 
Since the raison d' etre of permanent neutrality has been to stay aloof from the 
intricacies of the Cold War and superpower animosity, it is important to consider the viability 
of permanent neutrality as a foreign policy strategy for a liberated South Africa against this 
backdrop. It should be stated at the outset that the question of viability of neutrality looks 
different from the perspective of war, on the one hand, and that of peace, on the other. 
The demise of the Cold War, and the emergence of 'A New World Order' in the 
aftermath of Operation Desert Storm for 'the liberation of Kuwait' in 1991, undoubtedly 
negatively impacted permanent neutrality as foreign policy orientation. To this should also' 
be added the dynamics of European integration and co-operation in search of a new European 
interdependent paradigm. From these perspectives, and more importantly, in the present 
Cold War status quo post bellum, the question of permanent neutrality or not takes on yet 
another form: is permanent neutrality feasible as a peacetime foreign policy strategy? '_ -
The point of the above hypothesis is, the less likely a new Great power hot-war, the 
more independent the problem of the question of wartime neutrality and a neutral defence 
policy, and the less feasible permanent neutrality as foreign policy orientation becomes. 
It is evident that the changes in the overall international balance of power and the end 
of the Cold War makes permanent neutrality far less attractive as a foreign policy alternative 
than during the era of the super-:-power balance of terror. 43 Conversely, the counter 
argument would seem to suggest that the viability of neutrality obviously grows in proportion 
to the internal domestic attraction and demands, and that South Africa would be a suitable 
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candidate in this regard. Unfortunately for South Africa, the newly liberated state would 
hardly be in a position to exercise a choice. The new democratic South Africa would, by 
and large, be compelled to maximize its political, diplomatic and economic interacti~ns with 
the international community in order to realize its foreign policy goals and meet its 
demanding socio-economic challenges. Suffice it to say that permanent neutrality would 
place substantial restrictions on the new apartheid-free state's international freedom of 
movement and flexibility to manoeuvre.44 Thus permanent neutrality, as attractive as it 
might seem at first sight, should in effect also be considered a non-starter for a post-
apartheid, democratic South Africa. 
4.3 Non-Alignment: Towards a Viable Foreign Policy Strategy for a Liberated South 
Africa 
A great deal of confusion has been caused in the study of neutrality by the emergence 
of Third World Non-alignment. The principles and policies of the recently emerged 
orientation of non-alignment partly converge with those of neutrality, the main common point 
being the rejection of membership in multi-lateral great power alliances.45 This iSr by 
the way, a typical ingredient of balance of power politics. There are, however, fundamental 
differences as well. Above all, non-alignment is the foreign policy strategy adopted and 
pursued by the liberated new states of the developing Third World whose main concerns, at 
least until recently, have been genuine decolonization and the removal of apartheid, national 
liberation, inter-Third World co-operation and solidarity, and the restructuring of the 
predominantly 'liberal' international economic and political system. 46 
A distinction should be drawn here between non-alignment as a principle of foreign 
policy and the non-aligned as a collective movement in world politics. This treatise is mainly 
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concerned with the former aspect of non-alignment. 
Some observers hold that non-alignment as a coherent body of ideas and principles, 
propounded by a group of like-minded states, was not born until 1961.47 In 1964, 
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moreover, the participants in the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States moved to 
declare that "under present conditions, the existence and activities of non-aligned countries 
in the interest of peace are one of the more important factors for safeguarding world 
-
peace".48 The participants went further to " ... consider it essential that the non-aligned 
countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and 
security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these 
issues" .49 
According to Peter Willets, peaceful co-existence, equal state relations, co-operation 
for development and the ending of colonialism, are.demands upon all non-aligned countries, ' 
and together constitute a comprehensive 'foreign policy programme' of non-alignment.5o 
The September 1970 Lusaka Declaration on Peace is the closest the Non-aligned Movement 
came to articulating, conceptually that is, the principles of Non-Alignment. The Lusaka 
Conference declared that: 
... the following continue to be the basic aims of non-alignment: the pursuit 
of world peace and peaceful co-existence by strengthening the role of non-
aligned countries within the United Nations so that it will be a more effective 
obstacle against all forms of aggressive action and the threat of use of force 
against the freedom, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any 
country; the fight against colonialism and racialism which are a negation of 
human equality and dignity; the settlement of disputes by peaceful means; 
the ending of the arms race followed by universal disarmament; 
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opposition to the establishment of foreign military bases and foreign troops on 
the soil of other nations in the context of great power conflicts and colonial 
and racist suppression; the universality of and the strengthening of the efficacy 
of the United Nations; 
and the struggle for economic independence and mutual co-operation on a 
basis of equality and mutual benefits.51 
During the early stages, the term non-alignment was substituted with that of 'positive 
neutrality'. 52 The prefix 'positive' was intended to be an instructive one: non-alignment, 
it was alleged, seeks to be 'part of the solution'; not 'part of the problem' .53 Non-
alignment neither requested nor required outside guarantees beyond the accepted commitment 
towards Peaceful Co-existence, the golden-rule of non-alignment established at Bandung in' 
1955. Far from opting out of the system, like the roles pursued by traditionally,neutral 
states, the non-aligned vigorously sought to exercise a pro-active diplomacy by asserting their 
sovereignty as active and legitimate members of the international society. 
The non-aligned movement always saw as one of their tasks the importance -of 
emphasizing the principle of non-involvement in the controversies dividing the world. It 
reflected a certain conception that sees formal association with any alliance as reducing the 
freedom and cohesion of the Third World. The desire to avoid involvement in the East-West 
bi-polar rivalry was primus inter pares among these concerns of the non-aligned states. 
It is important to emphasize here that this abstentionist posture of non-alignment can 
be goal-directed, and the principles and policies of a non-aligned party in this regard 
converge to some degree with those of neutrality, the main common ingredient being the 
outright repudiation of membership in multi-lateral great power alliances and balance of 
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power politics. 54 
Edogum depicted non-alignment as a 'protest-demand' ideology: on the one hand 
members of the Third World bloc protest against economic exploitation and dependence, as 
well as hegemony and dominance of the 'advanced capitalist world' in the international 
system, and on the other hand they demand that the wealthy countries must make special 
efforts in helping the once-subjected poor countries to catch Up.55 The n6ri.-wgned body 
has long placed a high premium on distributive justice to compensate for years of European 
imperial and colonial exploitation.56 In order to realize its goals, the Non-aligned 
Movement has long raised their voices in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, apartheid and racism. 
It is important to stress here that non-aligned orientations can be linked to a series of 
domestic considerations and pressures with which ~overninents have to grapple on a constant 
basis. Some actors have opted for non-alignment as a means of obtaining m~imum 
economic concessions from as many blocs in the system as possible. 57 To be non-aligned 
is therefore also to maximize opportunities and possibilities to meet complex socio-economic 
needs and demands, while minimizing dependencies. 58 
A seriously re-defmed non-alignment - or internationalism - can be well suited to the 
domestic political conditions and needs of developing countries in search of security and 
prosperity. Some of the non-aligned units in the past came to realize that it pays political 
dividends at home, as well as abroad, to portray the impression of not making any permanent 
military or ideological commitments and to protect their independence. 
Non-alignment, it is often argued by its practitioners, greatly increases the diplomatic 
influence and manoeuvrability of those who adopt it as foreign policy strategy. As 
independent and sovereign units, non-aligned states have room to manoeuvre and may be able 
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to exert influence on the behaviour and actions of all contending blocs in the system. Non-
alignment, qualified Michael Sinclair, "is not an isolationist or "non-committal" policy but 
implies that non-aligned states must inevitably take sides in any international issue or 
conflict ... The essence of non-alignment is the right to decide freely in accordance with the 
interests, ideals and objectives of one's country". 59 
In short, non-alignment is relevant and appropriate in explaining both the external 
threat perception and the domestic, economic and political variables of states. 
A post-apartheid South Africa will be in a unique position, not only to adopt non-
alignment as foreign policy strategy, but also to make an indispensable contribution to the 
reorientation of non-alignment for the demands of post-Cold War conditions. It should be 
stressed here that a lot of the contents of non-alignment were relevant for the cold-war era; 
that era is now gone and the non-aligned states will have to seriously re-position themselves 
for international circumstances without the cold war. 
The ANC's National Conference of July 1991 rightly observed in this regard that a 
future foreign policy must take cognisance of the realities and dynamics of "contemporary 
international relations, characterized in part by ... · a tendency towards the disappearan~e of 
the Cold War and a departure from the conduct of international relations on the basis of a 
bi-polar order, dominated by the conflicting interests of the super-power and the two military 
blocs, Nato and the Warsaw Pact. .. ". 60 
It should be stated here that non-alignment needs to be redefined and reorientated in 
order to become pro-active in posture so as to suit the demands of international relations in 
a post-Cold War world. The point is, non-alignment has for long been little more than a 
repudiation of the bi-polar order with its competitive groupings and confrontation zones that 
came to dominate the post-1945 international order. According to Professor Holsti, non-
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alignment as orientation was more geared toward the East-West conflicts than as a true 
strategy toward all issues in the international system.61 In an international order 
characterized by diffuse structures or diffuse-bloc structures, there will be little room and 
little reason for this kind of orientation. Some scholars also argue that the complex and 
multi-faceted North-South dispute will start to figure more prominently on the global agenda 
in the post-Cold War arena. 62 With the emphasis increasingly on the contentious North-
South axis, therefore, the Non-aligned Movement will have to become less confrontational 
and isolationist in approach, and geared more towards pushing for wealth-welfare issues. 
It is going to be crucial for a liberated South Africa to face up to the challenge of 
exploiting the opportunities and dynamics of a vastly different world order after the Cold 
War. As early as a decade ago, Dennis Venter rejected "confrontational" and "isolationist" 
foreign policy conceptions for South Africa and suggested that South Africa should instead 
pursue a foreign policy of flexible response, combining the best ingredients of a three-
dimensional posture, viz.: 
Substantive technical-functional cooperation on a regional level, and domestic 
policy adjustments in order to create the right climate and provide a sound 
substructure for an 'association of states in Southern Africa'; 
Lasting normalization of relations and rapprochement with black Africa; and 
The pursuit of a purposeful and consistent 'non-aligned' direction in foreign 
policy globally. 63 
These proposals are in line with one of the most important functions that non-
alignment seeks to perform, namely the determination to maintain the international freedom 
to manoeuvre and base actions on the dictates of the national interests of the state rather than 
dogmatic ideological prescriptions. Perhaps the most crucial function which non-alignment 
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intends to perform is the maximization of foreign policy alternatives and manoeuvres in 
international politics freely and without any severe restrictions and limitations. Non-
alignment, therefore, seeks to create and articulate viable foreign policy options, and to 
implement them in practice. 
Non-alignment, as proposed here, is a new foreign policy orientation for anew, 
apartheid-free South Africa. It would be the best possible means of establishing and securing 
an external milieu favourable to the stability, prosperity and security of the new democratic 
South Africa. Non-alignment will also have, as one of its major functions, to try and 
influence the external milieu so that it becomes favourable for South Africa to pursue its 
goals and interests. The ANC noted the important rider in this regard that "The foreign 
policy of a democratic South Africa will be primarily shaped by the nature of its domestic 
policies and objectives directed at serving the needs and interests of our people. ,,64 
It should be warned, however, that non-alignment is no panacea for the problems and 
challenges that a post-apartheid South Africa will face on the home front. Nor is non-
alignment a legitimate substitute for inadequate defence measures in the face of threats to 
South Africa's national stability and security. Non-alignment is furthermore no guarantee 
against possible confrontational and isolationist foreign policy conceptions of a possible 
unstable and desperate post-apartheid regime that might come to replace the racial oligarchy 
of the past. On the contrary, non-alignment might in fact serve to stimulate flexibility in 
favour of foreign policy manoeuvres in defence of the new regime. 
In conclusion, it is worth remembering that successful strategies of non-alignment 
require the juxtaposition of many conditions, all of which include, inter alia, favourable 
structure of power and influence in the system; national capacity to defend independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity against extraneous foreign forces; the benevolent attitudes 
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or indifference of the great powers; reasonable remoteness from the main centres of 
international and regional conflicts; reductions in the levels in inter-state conflict; and 
securing a reasonable level of internal political stability . 
. ;: . 
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Chapter V 
Transition Scenarios: South Africa's Functionipg Anarchy? 
... One should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of 
success, nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new order of things. 
Niccolo Machiavelli 
Any recommended foreign policy orientation for South Africa beyond apartheid 
should rest on a number of key assumptions regarding the nature of the post-apartheid state 
and the transition process en route to that order. Foreign policy benefits for South Africa 
will, in any event, mainly derive from the developments and successes on the home front. 
South Africa's alleged national greatness, it seems, will in future be largely defined in terms 
of domestic behaviour and cohesion. Only by being strong at home, it has been pointed out 
by some, can South Africa hope to be strong abroad. As the old truism goes, '[a]ll politics 
are local'. 
An important observation should be noted at the outset: South Africa's politics, in 
both its black-white and black-black dimensions, constitutes essentially a struggle for power 
and influence in a quasi-anarchical arena. Power is defined here as the control, allocation, 
and distribution (read: re-distribution) of resources. In the South African quasi-anarchical 
arena, violence and instability are the rules, order and justice the exceptions. Some would 
in fact argue that South Africa is little more than a functioning anarchy. 
Because of this power struggle, South Africa seemed to have been in a position to 
exercise two options in its attempt to effect change and political transformation. The one 
option was that of a revolutionary overthrow of the apartheid order; the other alternative was 
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that of a hard-won negotiated settlement of the protracted apartheid dispute. 
There seems to have been a realisation on the part of South African negotiators that 
a revolutionary zero sum overthrow of the apar~heid order would merely have served to 
obfuscate and destroy the chances of a steadfast democracy replacing the apartheid status 
quo. This violent option, it was argued, would furthermore have had far-reaching 
implic_ations and adverse repercussions for favourable foreign policy manoeuvring after 
apartheid. Besides, it would have been a futile error to replace the apartheid racial oligarchy 
with yet another desperate regime and volatile order. 
The negotiated alternative on the other hand, one could argue, was ipso facto the best 
means of establishing and securing a relatively stable and firm democratic order after 
apartheid; one that will have the important benefit of enjoying international acceptance and 
legitimacy. The ANC' s Harare Declaration properly stated in this regard that the contending 
parties to the South Africa power-struggle" ... should, in the context of the necessary climate, 
negotiate the future of the country and its people in good faith and in an atmosphere which, 
by mutual agreement between the liberation movements and the South African regime, would 
be free of violence. 111 
An important observation that is more than likely to have an implacable bearing on 
South Africa's future external relations should be noted here: the spiral of violent crime and 
potential political instability endemic in contemporary South Africa. The threat in some 
quarters - especially by militant white Afrikaner - of a violent destabilization of the of 
nascent democracy in South Africa is becoming a well-known phenomenon. What is more, 
there are clear indications that this conspicuous trend is likely to continue unabated in future. 
Hence the prognosis by some of the more pessimistic observers that South Africa is in fact 
heading for a broken-backed, Lebanon-style anarchy; that is to say the gradual disintegration 
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of societal stability, and the eventual collapse of order, that will, all in all, inevitably lead 
to the elevation of disorder into a perpetual and uniquely-styled anarchy in South Africa.2 
But why the analogy with Lebanon? Indeed, the <.>nce unprecedentedly prosperous Lebanon 
-. . 
now finds itself in a state of overall anarchy. It is ironic that the roots of Lebanon's present 
troubles, just like that of South Africa, lie mainly in its ethnic and racial tensions. Years of 
perpetual civil war had unquestionably reduced Lebanon to a state of general war. Few 
observers of the Lebanese crisis saw any obvious way out of the quagmire, given the 
protracted positions of the key participants and the obstinate loyalties and fears which for so 
long underpinned them.3 
Does South Africa truly run the risk being turned into a Lebanon style anarchy? This 
depends on a number of variables, including the ability of the suggested government of 
national unity (gnu) to hold together and consolidate democracy. If negotiations work out it' 
is highly likely that such a government will comprise of candidates that does not necessarily 
share the same sense of purpose in such an arrangement; hence, that government will be 
faced, at least some times, with clashes of interests between its members, and this could 
threaten the workability and survivability of it. The consolidation of the nascent and infant 
democracy will therefore be crucial. 
If violence escalates, needless to say, the infant post-apartheid democracy will become 
nakedly vulnerable in the face of potential anarchy. That is why some analysts have argued 
that, given such a scenario, a Brazilian-option of authoritarian, most probably military, rule, 
with a facade of multi-party power sharing, seem to be the inevitable root for South Africa. 
Rennie Kotze and Deon Geldenhuys, in an analysis of probable prognoses for South Africa, 
predicted, amongst other things, a potential "NP-ANC executive coalition with the hallmarks 
of a typical bureaucratic, authoritarian state".4 In this scenario, a government of joint rule 
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will assume the role of "guardians of law and order", first and foremost. But the Brazilian 
option is not a forgone conclusion; this scenario too depends on a number of variables and 
factors - including the prospects for holding a diyi~ed centre together. In other words, the 
greater the level of consolidating democracy, the less likely the Brazilian option and the 
higher the prospects of affecting a workable government of national unity (gnu). Conversely, 
the lower the chances of effectively consolidating democracy, the greater the prospects for 
resorting to the Brazilian-option, and the greater the threats to the government of national 
unity. 
This brings us to an important observation: because negotiation is no panacea, the 
politics of negotiation, and foreigners, will hardly be in a position to come to the rescue of 
South Africa's infant democracy after apartheid. It would be fair to conclude, therefore, that 
unless government and all contending participants to the proposed government of national 
unity pact come to grips with political instability, crime and their violent vicissitudes, very 
little will come of its envisioned post-apartheid democracy, let alone its external relations. 
Either way, the outcome of South Africa's convoluted transition will have important 
implications for the country's foreign policy and international affairs. In other words,- the 
outcome of the transition wi11largely determine South Africa's standing in the world after 
apartheid. 
Once the stage of successful negotiations has finally been reached, South Africa's 
"functioning anarchy" will be forced to confront a new range of problems and challenges that 
may prove every bit just as intractable as did apartheid. Some would argue that South Africa 
clearly highlights the frustrating verity that a good cause does not necessarily ensure a good 
outcome. To repeat the old adage: the more things change, the more they stay the same. 
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Chapter VI 
South Africa from Pariah to Paragon: The National Roles and Role Conceptions of a 
Post-apartheid South Africa 
... There is no such thing as absolute power. Whatever the wealth, the power, and the prestige 
of a nation may be, its means are always limited. The problems of the makers of policy is to 
select objectives that are limited - not the best that could be desired but the best that can be 
realized without committing the whole power and the whole wealth and the very existence of the 
nation. 
Walter Lippmann 
The ability of any state (South Africa) to secure its survival, security, and prosperity 
in the international system is critically dependent on the endowment and utility of its elements 
of national power;1 that is to say, those factors and resource instruments that collectively 
constitute the power-in-being and power potentiality of the state. Some elements of national 
power are natural factors commonly subject to human control or alteration, while a great deal 
of the ingredients of natural power are natural factors not ordinarily subject to human 
impulses, organisation, and capacities. 2 
The major components in the national power equation include inter alia: 3 1) the size, 
location, climate, and natural topography of the national territory; 2) the natural resources, 
sources of energy, and foodstuffs that can be produced; 3) the population, its size, density, 
age and sex composition, and its per capita relationship to national income; 4) the size and 
efficiency of the industrial plant; 5) the extent and effectiveness of the transportation system, 
infra structure and communications media; 6) the educational system, research facilities, and 
the number and quality of the scientific and technical elite; 7) the size, training, equipment, 
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and spirit of the military forces and army; 8) the nature and strength of the nation's political, 
economic, and social system, 9) the quality and strengths of its diplomats and diplomacy; 10) 
the policies, attitudes and perceptions of the natiop '.s leaders; and 11) the national character 
and morale of its people. All these factors (or elements) determine how strong a country is. 
It is crucial to bear in mind that there is no single constituent or tool of national 
r· -
power_ that is likely to be exclusively decisive in determining a country's influence and 
preponderance, or for that matter the outcome of its relations with other states. Most power 
factors and results are relative in time and to the strength of other actors, and any assessment 
of national capabilities that omits consideration of the comparative nature and relative 
strength of other states may turn out to be dangerous to the nation's security. Conversely, 
the effectiveness of a nation's strength, influence, and capabilities also rest strongly on how 
other states assess its elements in the power equation, and the subsequent action produced 
by these assessments.4 In the final analysis, though, the effectiveness with which national 
power is employed to achieve a state's objectives depends chiefly on how successful the 
nation's leaders marshal, integrate, and direct the instruments and tools of national power in 
pursuit of its goals. 
6.1 South Africa and Africa: A Case in Giantism 
It has often been remarked that South Africa is the Leviathan and force de maitre of 
Africa: a small power on the periphery of global politics, but a superpower in regional 
terms. 5 Hence, the all too familiar equation of South Africa's position in the region with 
typical hegemonic principles, in both official and scholarly discourse. 
The "old" diplomacy of the apartheid era frequently made reference to the "Regional 
power", "Powerhouse of the Region", "Power Point", and most recently "The Gateway", 
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"The Agent of Salvation for Africa", and the "Hub of the South".6 The underlying theme, 
which is being reinforced repeatedly, domestically as well as by powerful external actors, 
is that a powerful "solution", indeed "redempti0l}"?· for Southern Africa, and the whole of 
Africa for that matter, is the endorsement and replenishment of South Africa's hegemony. 
For example, during official public relations exercises and their highly-touted foreign 
summits with key external players over the course of the last four years of the transition, 
South African officials typically and self-consciously appropriate and confer for themselves 
the roles and functions of the self-approved representatives, protectors, and custodians of the 
interests of the entire region.7 This continued a long theme in South Africa's politics and 
foreign policy; the projection of perpetual South African hegemony, or suzerainty, over the 
black states in the region has long played a central part in South African official thinking. 
The Nation Party's (NP) Plan of Action for the whites-only general election of 6 
September 1989, for example, avowed that "South Africa, as the regional power in Southern 
Africa, must play an increasingly dynamic role in this subcontinent". 8 Similarly, during his 
now celebrated 'epoch-making' address of 2 February 1990, President De Klerk asserted that 
"the government is prepared to enter into discussions with other Southern African countries 
with the aim of formulating a realistic development plan". 9 In similar fashion, De Klerk 
proclaimed during the opening of parliament in February 1991 that "South Africa is also 
interested in how current world events will affect our region ... Regional developments is of 
decisive importance to South Africa". 10 During an interview with the Washington Times 
on 6 May 1990, De Klerk went as far as lamenting that" Africa projects a dismal picture that 
goes from bad to worse. I've met with many African leaders and they realize that South 
Africa must be the springboard, the platform, from which the economic revival of Southern 
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Africa must be launchedlly During his summit-meeting with President George Bush at the 
White House, Pretoria's Commander-in-Chief similarly maintained that lIin being one of the 
strongest regional powers in the southern hemisp'h~re, being the hope of the rebuilding of 
prosperity and opportunity for almost the whole continent of Africa, where South Africa will, 
by shaking hands, as we are now already doing with you and with others, will play a 
constructive role in ensuring stability on the globe ... II . 12 Similarly, during what was hailed 
as his IIEuropean lap of honourll , De Klerk boldly declared that II All are waiting anxiously 
for us to succeed. The world is waiting to welcome us back. Our neighbours want us to 
prevail. Africa is waiting for our successll .13 President De Klerk even went as far as 
linking the volatile reform process in South Africa to the economic survival of Africa when 
he avowed that liThe political die in South Africa is cast. There is no turning back in the 
road to a new and just South Africa. What is at issue is the economic future of South Africa' 
and, in fact, the African continent II . 14 
The 'greater dialogue' between Pretoria and African states had, in fact, the prime 
objective of asserting South Africa's purported IIco-responsibility for the upliftment of 
countries in Southern Africa and especially Africa where conditions are deteriorating almost 
daily. 1115 South Africa II with its infrastrUcture, strategic location, relatively strong economy, 
and advanced skill II , argued Pretoria, II could play a vital role in the survival of the 
continent" .16 IIHoweverll, warned De Klerk, IISouth Africa's downfall would also mean 
Africa's downfall II . 17 
Even powerful foreign actors joined in the chorus of replenishing South Africa's 
alleged pivotal and prestige role in Africa. The French Secretary of State for Humanitarian 
Aid, Dr. Bernard Kouchier, claimed that IIthis country is so important for Africa that we 
must pay special attention to what is going on herell .18 The German Deputy Foreign Affairs 
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Minister Helmut Schaefer, on his part also declared that "South Africa could playa very 
important role towards stabilizing southern Africa and Germany would do everything it could 
to make this possible. ,,19 Former United States Assistant secretary of State for African 
Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, went to extra lengths to strongly plead for the "need to 
acknowledge South Africa's critical role as an engine of growth for the rest of southern 
Africa" .20 
It is the specialists and commanders in charge of South Africa's Department of 
Foreign Affairs, moreover, who carne to boldly articulate a "New Africa Diplomacy". The 
"new" diplomacy identified Africa as a special foreign policy target to try and boost South 
Africa's profile as an indispensable African performer. Pretoria's Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Roelof "Pik" Botha vehemently disclosed that "We in South Africa must ensure that we 
remain economically strong, that our strength as a regional power subtly filters through and 
that Africa and Southern Africa take note that without South Africa there is no solution to 
the problems of this region" .21 Botha's 'Marshall Plan' went even further and stated that 
"Many African leaders agree with us that apartheid is no longer the issue. The issue is 
Africa's survival: economically, socially, and politically".22 
Pik Botha's second in command, the Director General of Foreign Affairs Mr Neil 
Van Heerden, hailed South Africa as "a mature regional power" with the "infrastructure and 
capabilities to be the cornerstone of regional develop!llent". 23 In strict realpolitik terms, 
seemingly forgetting that great powers also have great responsibilities, Van Heerden divulged 
that "nations have interests, not friends", and South Africa will only "tilt towards Africa 
under conditions of vital national interest" .24 Van Heerden went on to avow: "We have a 
head start. Politically we are in the world game" and South Africa's "diplomacy thus has 
a golden opportunity to lay the basis for future peace and prosperity in Southern Africa" .25 
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Leon Wessels, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, courted South Africa as 
"the launching pad" with an inherent ability to "literally be the catalyst for an economic 
about-turn in Southern Africa" .26 Wessels confessed that Pretoria "can and want to create 
~ -
opportunities" . Tl 
Ostensibly forgetting the Horn and Central Africa, Foreign Ministry officials went as 
far as jointing a "regions of influence plan", demarcating four economic-industrial "power-
houses" of the continent: Egypt in North Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, Kenya in East 
Africa, and, of course, South Africa in the Southern region.28 
The official Southern African Facts Sheet, in its September 1991 edition entitled 
"Southern Africa; A Stocktaking", arrogantly declared that "In Southern Africa there is 
growing pressure on governments to achieve closer interaction with South Africa and to 
move towards acceptance of that country as a full partner in the socio-economic structure of 
the subcontinent - a development which, by general consensus, would be a significarttboost 
to the struggling economies of the region" . 29 
In similar fashion the October 1991 edition of RSA Update, an official mouthpiece of 
the South African Embassy in London, labelled the Republic "South Africa: Sub-Saharan 
Economic Clout" and declared that "South Africa now wields more economic clout than all 
35 neighbouring states in Southern Africa put together".30 An advertisement in the British 
Financial Times of Friday 5 June, 1992, saluted South Africa as the "Gateway to Africa" 
and, indeed resounded the Republic as "the centre of one of the most sophisticated and 
technologically advanced economies in Africa". 31 The commercial went ahead and endorsed 
South Africa as "the gateway to the continent's largely untapped markets". 
Eric Leistner, African specialist of the Africa Institute of South Africa, an African 
affairs think-tank for the Department of Foreign Affairs, is of the opinion that "the facts of 
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geography, history, and economic life have turned Southern Africa into a regional system 
that is unique in Africa because it includes, and is focused on, the only industrialized 
economy south of the Sahara" .32 According to ~ei.stner, "The impulses from this regional 
power-house, in the form of trade, transport, labour migration, and technology transfers are 
felt throughout Southern Africa and beyond". 33 Leistner's colleague, Professor P. Smit, 
also t:choed these lyrics and argued that "whereas most African regional co-operation 
schemes have failed or have never got off the ground, even severe critics of present-day 
South Africa acknowledge that an informal but fairly effective regional system is in function 
in Southern Africa, centred on South Africa, ,,34 
Even the more prominent South African foreign policy scholars sought to objectively 
document South Africa's unparalleled economic, industrial and military giantism, and place 
the Republic's special and distinct missionary potential within its 'proper' African context. 
Despite the fact that South Africa belongs to the club of small powers, and forms part 
of the now greatly neglected African continent, argues Deon Geldenhuys, "South Africa will 
have at its disposal one particular potent bargaining instrument: its status as a regional 
power" .35 On the assumption that South Africa's economic and military capabilities will 
be maintained after apartheid, maintains Geldenhuys, South Africa "will in future still be in 
a position to exert a decisive influence on the destiny of Southern Africa. ,,36 
Peter Vale, too, insisted that South Africa's highest call to international service will 
be in Africa. 37 Vale even detected the ironical "Alarm bells ... ringing throughout the 
continent", urging the long suspended Republic to come in from the cold "to halt the 
continent's slide",38 Vale's line seems pretty simple: "a buoyant South Africa has the 
weight to lift the region out of its present malaise" .39 
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John Barratt, also convinced that Africa will finally become South Africa's home, 
resembled the sub-continent as South Africa's sphere of injluence.4o For Lance Morrow, 
there is but "one potential deus ex machina tq yvhich eyes are already turning: South 
Africa" .41 Many Africans, asserts Morrow, "believe that with apartheid withering away, 
South Africa will pull the continent out of its economic slough, and down the track of 
prosp~rity" .42 Because of the indispensable presence of the "giant", avowed Tom Young, 
"South Africa is arguably the only part of the African continent which can look forward to 
a genuinely regional dynamic" .43 Ruth Ayisi again contended that Africa is indeed "waiting 
for the giant" . 44 
6.2 Wither Africa? 
The permeating theme of the foregoing assertions is that Africa can, and indeed 
should be seen as South Africa's sphere ofinjluence; that is to say South Africa's demanding 
region of operation and preferential status. Sphere of influence in this regard, it is important 
to qualify, refers not so much to claims of dominance or control, but to assertions of 
military, economic and political exclusiveness and preponderance, determining the special 
rights, status, and responsibilities of the state - South Africa, in the region - Africa. 
Having outlined the special traits of South Africa's prodigious grandeur, it is crucial 
here to examine the peculiar characteristics of Africa, South Africa's "region of operation" 
and "sphere of responsibility", and to determine its objective position within the international 
society, and the emerging 'new world order'. 
The popular phrase 'ex Africa semper aUquid novi' , is particularly true in pessimistic 
terms. It is the rapid revolution of decolonization and Uhuru, in which African states came 
to assert their emergence onto the post-World War II international stage as legitimate 
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members of international society, that prompted the British Prime Minister in 1960, Harold 
Macmillan, to hail 'the winds of change blowing through the African continent'. The 
realities of post-independence Africa, however, .soon dampened the great optimistic Pan-
Africanist vision of a common and dynamic political, economic and military structure. 
Indeed, dreamed and envisioned Kwame Nkrumah:45 
_ ... once we start, the momentum will increase. With capital controlled by our 
own banks, harnessed to our own true industrial and agricultural development, 
we shall make our advance. We shall accumulate machinery and establish 
steel works, iron foundries and factories; we shall link the various states of 
our continent with communications by land, sea and air. We shall cable from 
one place to another, phone for one place to the other and astound the world 
with our hydroelectric power; we shall drain the marshes and swamps, clear 
invested areas, feed the under-nourished, and rid our people of parasites and 
disease. It is within the possibility of science and technology to make even 
the Sahara bloom into a vast field with verdant vegetation for agricultural and 
industrial developments. We shall harness the radio, television, giant printing 
presses to lift our people from the dark recesses of illiteracy ... 
Such far-fetched optimism, based on a strong anti-imperialist stance, proved greatly 
ill-founded to the realities of least-development in post-independence Africa. Suffice it to 
say here that centuries of slavery, the legacy of Westphalia, or 'The Black Man's Burden' 
as Basil Davidson would avow, and the scramble for Africa's heart, only served to secure 
a largely crippled and misformed Africa at birth. 
Africa's failure to build a genuine sense of nationhood every so often led to anarchy 
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and virtual collapse of law and order. Heinous dictators sprang up in some African countries 
masquerading as the self-appointed providers of security and order, and while they 
uncompromisingly championed 'one man, one vote:, the final motto of so many of Africa's 
post-colonial kleptocracies, all things being equal, was "one man, one vote ... once only! "46 
Fortunately for African dictators, the freezing politics of the post-War order served as a 
check_ on their grave violations of freedom and human rights. 
However, the end of the Cold War and the loosening of Moscow's grip on the former 
Soviet satellites, sparked off radical change throughout the globe, including Africa. The end 
of the post-World War II bi-polar balance of terror saw super-power animosity turning into 
a newly found rapprochement and cooperation, making plain to Africans that they had in fact 
outlived their strategic and ideological usefulness. The new post-Cold War Weltanchaaung 
of democratization and quests for human rights, self-determination and genuine prosperity 
blowing through many regions of the world, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible 
for Africa, with its dismal records on this score, to escape this 'second wind of change'. 
Needless to say that in future, only those African states which will be able to quench the 
thirst of their masses for participatory democratic politics and practice, security and 
prosperity, would have the possibility of avoiding even further social upheaval and instability, 
and restore relative order and stability in society. 47 
As the Western powers concentrate their resources on the 'more' strategically 
profitable countries of the newly liberated states of Eastern Europe, and seek to grapple with 
their own imperative of carving out a more interdependent Europe, Africa is in fact becoming 
further isolated by a new Iron Curtain of peripheralization; all this at her greatest hour of 
need. 
Lest the uncertain euphoria of the new world order lead to the same ill-conceived 
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optimism that accompanied the 'first wind of change', a few facts are worth bearing in mind 
about the African plight. Some analysts have been avowed in their criticism. Africa, one 
analyst noted, has developed an incompatible problem and bent of chaos theory; a destructive 
paradigm par excellence. 48 A great deal of the African continent, he continued, has turned 
into a neo-post-colonial scramble for existence and survival; a battleground of contending 
~ - -
dooms;49 a state of affairs too ghastly to contemplate: famine and starvation, AIDS and over 
population, illiteracy and homelessness, corruption and social break-down; fading resources 
and drought, war and the common practice of coups d'etat. 
The 'vast and mysterious' continent, as some Afro-pessimist argued, has become well 
grounded as 'The Third World of the Third World'. Of the 169 countries that make up the 
United Nations Annual Development Index of economic and political progress, 32 of the 40 
poorest and lowest on the chart are indeed African states.50 Between the United Nations 
First Development Decade (1960 - 1970) and The Third Development Decade (1980 ~ 1990), 
Africa's share of the global Gross National Product (GNP) dropped from 1,9 per cent to 1,2 
per cent.51 Over the last decade (1980 - 1990), Africa's foreign debt has tripled to about 
$174 billion.52 The continent desperately needs additional financial resources to ease its 
external debt problems and to implement the OAU and UN endorsed Programme of Action 
on Africa's Recovery and Development 1986 - 1990, as well as the New Agenda for Action 
for the Development of Africa. 53 Although the average external resource requirements of 
these programmes is estimated at US $ 24 billion, based on 1985 price levels, total net 
resource flows to Africa as a whole in 1985 was about $16 billion.54 The situation has 
since gotten worse, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, there is now a reverse net 
transfer of resources flow from Africa. The New Agenda envisages that African GNP must 
grow by at least 6 per cent per annum in real terms, in order to enable the continent to 
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double per capita income by the year 2015.55 This level of growth will require $30 billion 
in resources during 1992 alone. 56 
Infant mortality in Africa stands at 120 per every 1,000 live births; as many as sixty 
per cent of all Africans are illiterate; only twenty-five per cent of all Africans have access 
to safe drinking water; and in a continent plagued by multifarious diseases, there is but one 
- - . 
doctOl: for every 2400 people. 57 Life in some quarters in Africa is indeed pretty 'nasty, 
brutish and short', as Thomas Hobbes would have lamented. 
6.3 South Africa: Bound to Lead? 
South Africa's region of operation, it is clear, is not a particularly pleasant one. 
Africa's marginalisation is real and is becoming increasingly burdonbsome. Given the grim 
features of South Africa's region of ascendancy, a non-aligned (or internationalist) South 
Africa would be compelled to pursue and marshal a substantive, vigilant and pro-active 
foreign policy. 
The following is an elucidation of the more credible and responsible role 
performances that a post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy posture should include; the 
absence of which make it difficult to see how the country's foreign affairs will come of age. 
I) Regional leader . In a predominantly western dominated self-help international system 
that demands of each state to take care of, and cater for, its own interest first and foremost, 
South Africa will have to realize that it does not only have vital national interests, but also 
demanding duties and responsibilities, especially towards its neighbours in Africa. 
South Africa will in particular be challenged into an organising and leadership role. 
This should not be taken to mean that South Africa should not actively pursue its own 
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legitimate interests. On the contrary, South Africa, just like any other state in the 
international system, will obviously be concerned, in the first instance, with securing its own 
position in the international society. It will be jrpportant for South Africa therefore, to 
organise its foreign policy around the strict understanding of its vital interest and 
responsibilities based on its proper international, domestic and vocational context. 
_ In a post-Cold War era of multipolarity and complex inter-dependence, the 
management of interdependence should be a major rationale for investing South Africa's 
resources in regional leadership and must be central to a post-apartheid foreign policy 
strategy. Moreover, as interdependence and the diffusion of power increasingly grow, the 
implications for stability and welfare will depend heavily on whether the strongest state takes 
lead in organising collective action. 58 Getting the other states in Africa to share the costs 
of providing order and stability will have to become a crucial ingredient of a future, post-
apartheid foreign policy wisdom. In short, because South Africa carries more leverage and 
prestige as a strong power in the region, it will have to act wisely and prudently in 
organising leadership for collective action in southern Africa in particular, and Africa in 
general. It is particularly within the framework of the former Frontline States arrangement 
that South Africa would be able to play an important role in organising a new security 
arrangement for the sub-region. 
2) Regional protector. Deriving from its leadership posture in the region, South Africa 
should assume an active role in creating protection, especially by the creation of new military 
defence and security structures, for the adjacent states, and the region in general. The 
establishment of Frontline security arrangement will be important on this score as well. 
It should be said at the outset that South Africa must avoid developing a presumption 
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that it must act boldly and police Africa. Some African states have already argued that South 
Africa is not the father figure of Africa and should not act as such. Instead, South Africa 
should attempt to maintain its current levels of )~i1itary strength in order to articulate a 
regional security policy that encompass matters beyond military threats. Intervention, in 
particular humanitarian intervention, and the use of military force, undesirable as it might 
appear at first sight, may in fact become inevitable in future. Rwanda in particular has 
already posed that challenge to South Africa. Soon after the Rwanda crisis escalated, the new 
democratic republic came under persistent pressure to assume a crucial role in attempts to 
resolve the crisis in that country. 
On the non-military front South has already been approached by the UN and OAU 
to playa role in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho. Even US president Bill Clinton thought 
that the inclusion of South African forces in the prospective US-led invasion of Haiti might 
be an important factor tipping the moral balance in his favour back in the US. 
South Africa, some observers point out, should realize the necessity of distinguishing 
constantly between that which is really important to it in the world in terms of its potential 
power and responsibilities, and that which is not. In so doing South Africa will be 
compelled, every so often, to put aside such comfortable possessions as emotional judgement 
and instead move to look at the international and regional environment coldly and 
realistically. 
3) The Practice of a Proactive Independence 
By asserting its integrity as an independent and sovereign state, South Africa will 
surely want to foster sound diplomatic relations with as many states as possible. " ... A future 
South African government", argued Deon Geldenhuys, "will try to integrate itself as fully 
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as possible into the international community in order to prove to the world that the era of 
forced isolation under apartheid is finally over". 59 The role of pro-active independence 
would therefore be " ... of major importance for the .new South African government in order 
to emphasize its break with apartheid and international isolation". 60 
A post-apartheid South Africa will therefore have to place a high premium on its 
profes_sional diplomacy. As the ANC rightly proclaimed, albeit only vaguely and generally: 
"A democratic South Africa will aim for the establishment of a professional foreign service, 
in which training, employment equity and affirmative action will be important components 
for the attainment of high standards of service". 61 
4) Mediator - Integrator. Based on its strengths and capabilities, South Africa will be 
relatively well equipped to pursue a stabilizing and conciliatory role in Africa by undertaking 
special mediatory and "fixing" tasks for the reconciliation of contending and conflicting 
states, especially in the region. The foundation stones of this conflict-resolutionary ·role for 
South Africa should be: 62 
1) Preventive Diplomacy; that is to say the articulation and marshalling of a coherent 
strategy and planned practice of action in order to prevent quarrels and disputes from arising 
between states in the region; to prevent existing and prevalent disputes from escalating into 
serious conflicts; and, if it comes to the worst, to limit the spread of violence and instability 
when they occur. This role seems to be appropriate especially for Lesotho; that crisis did not 
reach outright level yet and it seems to be a quarrel that could be contained peacefully. South 
Africa could play an important third-party or mediatory role in that country and get involve 
in preventive diplomacy efforts in order to resolve that conflict. 
2) Peacemaking; that is actions and concrete efforts to bring hostile and conflicting 
parties and states to agreement and peace, essentially through pacific means which include 
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inter alia: genuine negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, enquiry, judicial 
settlement, and resort to regional agencies and arrangements. This model could be pursued 
especially in Angola and Mozambique. 
3) Peace-keeping, that is to say the deployment and demonstration of military force, 
as last resort, with the consent of all the contending parties concerned. Peace-keeping, it is 
- - -
important to bear in mind, typically requires the successful resolution of conflicts and 
deliberate attempts to preserve the peace once it is attained. True and genuine resolution of 
conflicts occurs ultimately in the face of the successful application of the pacific means as 
outlined above. A post-election role for South Africa in Mozambique would seem to fit that 
of peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. 
The most desirable and efficient employment and utilization of diplomacy - beit in 
Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda or Lesotho - it should be pointed out, is to ease tensions 
before they escalate in conflict, or, conversely, when conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to 
contain it and seriously attempt to resolve its underlying causes.63 In the final analysis 
therefore, South Africa should realize that constructive and successful diplomacy depends on 
the resolution and addressing of the deepest causes and symptoms of the conflict: economic 
despair, social injustice, and political oppression. 64 
5) A Strong Regional-subsystem Collaborator 
This conception challenges a post-apartheid South Africa into profound and 
irrevocable commitments to cooperation and the building of understanding among the states 
in the regional sub-system and the Africa continent, and to act as a bridge in cooperation, 
communication, mediation, facilitation and integration. 
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The ANC's Freedom Chaner has long committed the organisation to " ... strive to 
maintain world peace and the settlement of international disputes by negotiation not war" . 65 
Similarly, the ANC's Policy Guidelines For A, I)emocratic South Africa of May 1992 
proclaimed that a post-apartheid foreign policy will "contribute to the democratization of 
international political and economic relations, and so help secure a global context within 
which_ a democratic South Africa will be able to coexist peacefully and to cooperate on a 
democratic basis with its neighbours in the region and further afield. ,,66 
By joining, amongst others, the following regional organisations after apartheid, South 
Africa would be in a position to make an indispensable contribution to regional cooperation 
and development: The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), The Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) , The African Development Bank, The Preferential Trade Area 
(PTA), and, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). South Africa can be instrumental in raising 
the effectiveness and prestige of organisations such as the OAU and the Non-Aligned 
Movement. All these organisations, from SADC, to the OAU, to the NAM, face the crucial 
challenge of reorientating themselves so as to become relevant and well-equipped for the 
challenges posed by the post-Cold War international dynamics. Furthermore, Africa in 
general, and the southern African sub-continent in particular does seem to run an increasing 
risk of overlap and duplication and streamlining and down-sizing these organisations does 
seem to be important. For example, the PTA, SADC and Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) all seems, by and large to perform the same function and one could make an 
argument in favour serious amalgamation. 
To be sure, regional cooperation after apartheid should become a deliberate policy, 
not just an opportunist interest or activity, but a conscious policy; a dedication and 
commitment. 
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6) Developer. It is as regional developer moreover, that South Africa's vital role will 
be called into service. The role of regional developer places a special duty and obligation 
on a post-apartheid South Africa to become ~ctively involved in the assisting in the 
development of the region as a whole. "It would be extremely shortsighted", avowed ANC 
Deputy-president, Walter Sisulu, "merely to seek to expand our own narrow short term 
intere~ts without taking the development needs of our partners aboard" .67 "Even from a 
self-interested trade point of view", Sisulu boldly stated, "we want Africa to grow and 
develop".68 "Over and above that", corroborated the deputy-president, "we recognise and 
accept an historic obligation to cooperate with our neighbours both in overcoming the 
imbalances which characterise the existing regional economy and in redressing the 
consequences of apartheid destabilization". 69 
In similar fashion, the ANC's Draft Manifesto On Economic Policy of 1992 avowed 
that "Trends in the world economy make it essential for countries located outside the major 
trading blocs of the advanced industrialized countries to forge greater cooperation". 70 "An 
ANC government", promised the Manifesto, "would give high priority to examining existing 
links and promoting close ties with other countries on the continent, and most especially, 
with our neighbours in the Southern African region". 71 
South Africa's developmental challenge will encompass all spheres of statecraft on 
virtually all levels: economical, military, industrial, developmental, diplomatic and political. 
The foreign policy of a liberated South Africa, affirmed Thabo Mbeki, chief of the ANC' s 
department of International Affairs, "... will have to address a number of matters in the 
political, economic and military-strategic fields at the regional, continental and global 
levels" . 72 "Broadly stated", Mbeki continued, "the objective of foreign policy would be to 
help create the situation at all these levels in which South Africa would exist and develop as 
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a democratic, non-racial, peaceful and prosperous country". 73 
Special emphasis will be placed on South Africa's skill and resources. The newly 
found rapprochement between South Africa and < Africa, said Pretoria's former Director-
General of Foreign Affairs, Neil van Heerden, "have raised the potential of increased 
cooperation in the field of development" .74 Convinced that South Afric~_ P?ssesses the 
necessary "indigenous" and "acclimatised technical expertise and scientific knowledge" which 
has already been tried and tested on Africa soil, Van Heerden is of the opinion that South 
Africa can make indispensable contributions in the areas of health, food production, mining, 
energy, animal production and veterinary services, engineering and conservation.75 
However, warns Van Heerden, "South Africa cannot hope to match the West in development 
capacity - for that we have neither the manpower nor the capital... Our contribution to 
Africa's developmental needs will be qualitative, rather than quantitative" .76 
7) A Foreign Policy Strongly Emphasizing Internal Development 
This crucial conception warns against South Africa overextending in regional and 
international affairs at the expense of grappling with its complex socio-economic problems 
back home. It begs for a regional and foreign policy with a strong inward-looking bias. 
It is important to reiterate here that only by being strong domestically can a post-
apartheid hope to be strong abroad and playa pivotal anchor role in foreign affairs. In fact, 
the revolution of rising expectations back home already anticipates that the post-apartheid 
administration will concentrate its efforts, first and foremost, on coming to grips with the 
enigmas on the home front. Unless South Africa successfully grapples with the dilemmas 
of domestic strife, its preeminence in Africa is bound to diminish. What is more, the 
realities of the South African situation suggest that the domestic political inertia wi11largely 
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remain persistent for some time in the foreseeable future. 
While it is true therefore, that a post-apartheid South Africa's development in the 
region will be tenuously balanced at best, the chaUe1.1ge remains that a liberated South Africa 
will have to find the proper equilibrium between domestic policy and foreign policy. 
8) _ South Africa: Setting the Example 
With the politics of genuine negotiations approaching its conclusion, South Africa will 
be in a position to gain prestige and influence in the international society by portraying its 
process of negotiations and the dispensation that is about to replace it as an 'ideal type' to 
other countries, in particular to the countries of Africa. 
"It is to be expected", said Professor Deon Geldenhuys, "that a post-apartheid South 
Africa would also playa strong missionary role in its foreign relations". 77 "Freed of 
apartheid and white authoritarianism" , the new democratic South Africa would certairily want 
to portray itself as "a crusader against practices such as racism and oppression, and as a 
model of reconciliation and liberation. ,,78 "A democratic South Africa, corroborated the 
ANC's Policy Guidelines, "will objectively promote the objectives of democracy, peace, 
stability, development, and mutually beneficial relations among the people of Africa as a 
whole, as well as Pan African solidarity. ,,79 
It is indeed ironic that South Africa, long condemned and expelled from the Pan-
African league for practising the morally repugnant system of apartheid, seem to be moving 
toward the fortuitous position of establishing one of Africa's few genuine democracies, albeit 
a highly unstable one. 
If South Africa manages to be successful in grappling with political instability and its 
violent vissicitudes, and move to establish an authentic ethos of tolerance and 
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accommodation, it faces the animated prospect of showing much of Africa a powerful new 
paradigm: how to practice the virtues of tolerance and accommodation in a divided society. 
South Africa can certainly become a leading play.eI: in Africa's long-stalled march towards 
democracy and peace by setting the example of establishing a firm dispensation of 
participatory democracy. 
r- -
_ This obviously means that South Africa itself will have to go beyond mere rhetorical 
exercise and become irrevocably committed and concerned with the goals and objectives of 
peace, human rights, self-determination of peoples, and democracy. 
South Africa's foreign policy, needless to say, will have to be transcended from one 
in defence of apartheid, to one that is driven by the commitment to racial equality, 
international peace, economic and social justice, and the strengthening of cooperation and 
good-neighbourliness. In short, South Africa will have to move from pariah to paragon. Put 
differently, South Africa's foreign policy must attain a bedrock self-confidence and esteem 
that its values are worth defending and promoting. The last thing that South Africa should 
do, however, is to act as the moral custodian of Africa. As the John Quincy Adams dictum 
goes: 'friends of liberty everywhere, custodians only of our own. ,80 In short, South Africa 
serves, for better or for worse, as an example to Africa and the rest of the world. 
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Conclusion 
We are not going to change the nature of man, nor to solve the dilemmas of political society. We 
are not going to find means to overcome the great irrational, emotional currents that sweep 
through nations and races and entire world areas... We are not going to be understood as a 
nation. In many instances we are not going to understand. All that [we] should do, is to follow 
the precepts of moderation and tolerance in foreign policy. 
George Kennan 
It has been the thrust of this thesis that the policy-makers of South Africa's racial 
oligarchically-run authoritarian state of the past have been too ill-equipped, intellectually, 
strategically and morally, to foresee, let alone adapt to, national political challenges and 
global queries at large. In fact, South Africa has, since 1948, conducted a foreign policy 
dangerously at odds with reality. The notion of apartheid on the one hand, and a 
constructive and purposive foreign policy on the other, needless to say, is inherently 
incompatible. 
The apartheid grand design, with its glorification of racial inequality and white 
supremacism could not endure in a post-UN Charter world society sensitive for, -and 
conscious of the politics of human rights, racial equality and the self-determination of people. 
A viable and successful foreign policy begs for a clear-cut fundamental sine qua non: the 
removal of apartheid and white minority domination, and the establishment of a faithful copy 
of constitutional democracy. 
When that stage is finally reached, South Africa's foreign policy will be confronted 
with two main challenges; a double catch-up game in effect: catch-up with the true 
imperatives of democracy and catch-up with mainstream thinking and paradigms in world 
affairs. 
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A non-aligned (or internationalist) South Africa will in the future have to realize that, 
it cannot depend too much on foreign policy largesse, but would have to count, by and large, 
on its own strengths. In the final analysis of thipgs, South Africa's international standing 
". . 
depends on the successful resolution of issues and challenges related to internal resilience and 
coping with the dilemmas of a divided and quasi-anarchical society. 
The sources of true strength, it will become apparent, lie much deeper than sheer 
regional and military prowess. It lies eventually in a stable and secure domestic order. 
The true predicament of South Africa's challenge should not be underestimated 
therefore. South Africa's case is unique and its case is new. Because its case is new, South 
Africa's statesmen will be compelled to think anew, and act anew. 
The last thing that South Africa should do is to engage in excessive wishful thinking 
by overestimating its capacities to come to the rescue of its neighbours. South Africa will" 
hardly be in a position to dictate lay down the rules and the law to Africa. Consider for 
example what can be depicted here as the giantism paradox, on the one hand, and the 
giantism dilemma, on the other. 
Notwithstanding the fact that South Africa can generate more economic and military 
muscle than all the states in the region put together, teaches the giantism paradox, the South 
African functioning anarchy finds itself in the grip of a socio-economic crisis of 
unprecedented proportions. The following synopsis vividly illustrates the point. Even during 
the height of enforced isolation and sanctions, when the international community sought to 
'squeeze the South African economy until the pips squeak', South Africa accounted for some 
80 percent of total GNP of the southern African issue-area; 75 percent of total export; and 
68 percent of its total imports.1 Military too it has been alleged that South Africa's 'super-
gun' outsmarts that of all the states in the region. 
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Yet, despite this manifest grandeur of the Republic's military-industrial complex, 
South Africa itself faces an illiteracy rate of over 40 percent back home. 2 In 1991 alone, 
South Africa's criminal homicide rate reached ap .astonishing 22,000, a murder rate five 
times that of the United States of America.3 In fact, the Republic is now well on its way 
to being entrenched in a unique culture of violent crime and South African politics is at best 
a two-speed process: the politics of crime running untrammelled alongside the politics of 
negotiations and reconciliation. To this should be added the fact that South Africa's own 
GNP is in the vicinity of US$2,300, much closer to that of Mexico or Argentina than to the 
United States, or for that matter Britain, the great empire on the decline.4 Contrary to 
popular conception, South Africa is not a First World state. South Africa came to establish 
itself firstly as a Third World country, not a First World state with Third World sectors. 
It is quite understandable therefore, emanating from the foregoing, that while a non-
aligned South Africa cannot afford to divorce itself from the challenges posed by its 
immediate region of responsibility, great emphasis will unavoidably have to be placed on 
correcting the vast socio-economic problems back home. If South Africa isolates itself from 
the problems of the region, the spill-over effect into its domestic affairs might just escalate 
the crisis back home. Similarly, in order for the region to succeed, South Africa will have 
to succeed domestically. To put it differently, if South Africa weathers its raging storm 
domestically, the region will benefit immensely. If, however, South Africa fails, the region 
will go down with it. 'When South Africa sneezes,' it is clear, 'the rest of the region catches 
pneumonia' . 
This brings us to the giantism dilemma. 5 It is true, following on from the giantism 
paradox, that there are great expectations prevalent in some African quarters that their strong 
sister in the south will come to play the long awaited mainstay role in the development and 
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'prosperity' of the continent in order to avert the further deterioration and peripheralization 
of the continent. It is clear, therefore, that if South Africa decides to withdraw from the 
region, Africa's fears would only increase. Conv~r~ely however, evidence suggests that the 
'bully-on-the-bloc-syndrome' ,6 reminiscent of the apartheid oriented foreign policy of the 
past, is not necessarily going to recede into the background of South Africa's perplexed 
regional politics. In fact, there is already great concern in some circles that yesterday'S bully 
is not out of necessity about to become tomorrow's friend. In the words of Charles W. 
Kegley, Jr and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "a powerful and obtrusive neighbour or one that might 
become so". 7 Africa, it seems, cannot live with South Africa, nor can it live without South 
Africa. 
South Africa's diplomacy and foreign policy face yet another great challenge 
therefore: how to persuade the states of the region that it wants to become instrumental in 
the development and advancement of Africa without the quest to become the typical regional 
hegemon. In the words of Neil van Heerden: "A primary task of South African diplomacy 
in Africa is to convince fellow Africans that South Africa has the will and the capacity and, 
most importantly, the heart to be a good partner in making Africa a better place to live in 
for all its children". 8 The litmus test of South Africa's future foreign policy, in other 
words, will be reassurance without dominance. 
All this places a series of indispensable requisitions on South Africa's future foreign 
policy. It demands that South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy should start from 
realism. It requires a post-pariah foreign policy that will act from strength, both in power 
and purpose. It orders a future foreign policy that will stress the vital need to generate 
consent, build lasting agreements, and, very important, to negotiate on vital and fundamental 
issues. It demands the levy that South Africa should strive to use its strengths with 
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prudence, firmness and balance. And it demands a strict realization of the premise that, 
ultimately, foreign policy begins at home. 
This seems to be a feaseblr way forward Jqr South Africa; this way forward is the 
strategy of active and constructive diplomacy and moderation, tolerance and leadership 
through an assertive, consistent and purposive foreign policy. 
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Notes to Conclusion 
1. See Christ Landsberg, "Beyond Apartheid: What new role can the 'regional giant' 
afford to play?" op. cit., p. 9. 
2. Ibid. 
3. See, for example, Chris Landsberg and mark Suzman, "South Africa's Quest for 
Democracy", op. cit., p. 27. 
4. Ibid. 
5. The idea of the giantism dilemma is borrowed from the concept security dilemma. 
Security dilemma refers to that predicament and case in the anarchical international 
arena that states, by striving to ensure and increase their own security - through 
policies that enhance their military capabilities, make other states inadvertently feel 
insecure. As a result, an endless web and spiral of security - insecurity arises. (See, 
for a brief discussion of the security dilemma Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, 
The Dictionary of World Politics, op. cit., p. 362). 
John Herz in his manuscripts Political Realism and Political idealism (1951), and the 
nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics (1976) was among the first scholars to 
conceptualize the security dilemma. Said Herz, Arms acquired for defensive purposes 
by some are perceived by others as constituting a threat, which then provokes similar 
behaviour by the one who feels threatened. In the words of Kegley and Wittkopf, 
"All nations search for strength; all cherish national advantage; none willingly accepts 
vulnerability" (World Politics, op. cit., p. 352). Hedley Bull also summed up this 
dilemma: the anarchical international society as it is consists of members who distrust 
one another and spend most of their time, if not actually attacking one another, then 
at the least protecting themselves from attack. (See The Anarchical Society, op. cit, 
p.27). 
6. See, for example, Harvey Tyson, "Straddling the World", in Leadership, South 
Africa's New World, op. cit., p. 14. Tyson prefers to speak of 'the big boy on the 
bloc'. 
7. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics, op. cit., p. 29. 
8. Neil P. van Heerden, South Africa and Africa: The New Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 9. 
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